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FISCAL GEOGRAPHY
Eric A. San Juan*
Abstract
While the newly published Opportunity Atlas maps the effect of
hometown on children’s life chances, this Article describes
geographically sensitive tax provisions in a historical context. Under the
recent Federal tax reform, the Opportunity Zone shadows predecessors
like the Recovery Zone, GO Zone, Liberty Zone, and Empowerment
Zone. While relief from unemployment and poverty attracts legislators’
sympathy, underlying these provisions is the ideology of the enterprise
zone, or the paradox of the governmentally created free market. This
Article analyzes that ideal concept by tracing the history of taxation in
barter as well as market economies. Wherever governments have
collected tax on a national scale, the fiscal result has been geographic and
ultimately economic redistribution. Then the question is whether that
redistribution advances horizontal or vertical equity. The legal
enforceability of socio-economic rights has become the philosophical
afterthought. Classically, the rule of law was posed as freedom from
government intervention, but the enterprise zone exemplifies freedom as
a legislative artifact. In this context, the incentive effect of the tax zone
legislation depends on the economic behavior of the taxpayer. The
empirical studies on enterprise zones document modest take-up by the
intended taxpayers, whose choices may reflect cultural psychology as
much as calculated rationality. There may be neither free market nor
rational actor in the enterprise zone. As a creation of tax law, the zone is
monitored by the tax collector, who falls into the odd role of facilitator
for the incentive provision. Governed by her own behavioral praxis, the
revenue agent becomes a functionary on a larger economic stage. In
particular, the desuetude of the American inner city and Rust Belt reflect
the fiscal geography of Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions past and
present. It may take an intervention more heroic than focused tax
incentives to revive a “blighted” market.

* Adj. Prof. Georgetown Univ. L. Ctr. Past Chair, Tax Pol’y Comm. Amer. Bar Assoc.
Founding member, Core Idea Group (exec. comm.) of Meridian-180.org, the multi-lingual
platform of the global policy consortium initiated by the Clarke Program on E. Asian L. & Culture,
Cornell Univ. A.B. 1987 Harv. J.D. 1991 ibid. M.A. 1996 Univ. of Chicago. The views expressed
in this Article are those of the author alone.
377

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

378

[Vol. 31

I.

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................378
A. Economic Geography .....................................................378
B. Overview .........................................................................380

II.

HISTORICAL & PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND ......................382
A. The Local Source of Revenue .........................................383
B. Hypothetical Geography ................................................386
C. Social Contract ...............................................................388
D. Rule of Law & Distributive Justice ................................389
E. Social Entitlements .........................................................390
F. Summary .........................................................................394

III.

LAND OF OPPORTUNITY ..........................................................394
A. Enterprise Zone ..............................................................396
B. Federal Legislation ........................................................399
C. Zone of Empowerment ....................................................400
D. Zones of Crisis ................................................................405
E. Zone of Recovery ............................................................410
F. Land of OZ......................................................................411
G. Summary .........................................................................413

IV.

TRAVELERS IN THE LAND OF OZ ............................................413
A. The Psychological Taxpayer ..........................................414
B. The Practical Bureaucrat ...............................................416
C. The Para-Ethnographer .................................................418
D. Summary .........................................................................421

V.

GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION ...................................................422

VI.

CONCLUSION ..........................................................................425
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Economic Geography

Recent research confirms the determinative effect of geography on
residents’ life chances. Collaborating with the United States Census, the
Opportunity Atlas traces the roots of outcomes such as poverty and
incarceration “back to the neighborhoods in which children grew up.”1
Following a five-year birth cohort, demographers can pinpoint where the
thirty-five- to forty-year-old adults now live, whether in prison or at
1. Raj Chetty et al., The Opportunity Atlas: Mapping the Childhood Roots of Social
Mobility 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25147, 2018), https://www.nber
.org/papers/w25147.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9FM-MNNU].
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large.2 It turns out that birthplace or hometown predicts adult success.
Neighborhoods matter.
The Opportunity Atlas sheds new light on an old concern. An earlier
notion in social science had posited that poverty “tends to perpetuate
itself.”3 Then, the “setting [was] a cash economy, with wage labor and
production for profit and with a persistently high rate of unemployment
and underemployment, at low wages, for unskilled labor.”4 There, “the
culture of poverty” was “both an adaptation and a reaction of the poor to
their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly individuated,
capitalistic society.”5 Where poverty was a stagnant milieu, one solution
could be to leave.
If America was a land of opportunity, part of the attraction was the
places to go. In the Unites States, a seminal thesis of cultural geography
has been that “the traditional spatial and social allocation of individuals
through the lottery of birth is being replaced gradually by a process of
relative self-selection of lifestyle, goals, social niche, and place of
residence.”6 Here, the advance of “voluntary regions” confirmed the
economic influence of geography.7
There is more to a place than the effect of individual residence
introduced above. “Geography matters because it affects the profitability
of various kinds of economic activities, including agriculture, mining,
and industry” and “the health of the population.”8 Writ large, the concern
extends from birthplace or hometown to the movement of populations
and production. Ultimately, productive populations form the tax base.
Now comes the Opportunity Zone (OZ). In this context, it should be
no surprise that OZ is attracting attention as a provision of the Federal tax
reform under implementation in the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act of 2017
(TC&JA ’17).9 Like its precursors, the OZ legislation offers income tax
reduction to businesses in impoverished zones.10 On one hand, the
alleviation of poverty garners popular sympathy. On the other hand, the
2. Id. “For example, 44% of black men who grew up in the lowest-income families in
Watts, a neighborhood in central Los Angeles, are incarcerated on a single day (April 1, 2010 –
the day of the 2010 Census). By contrast, 6.2% of black men who grew up in families with similar
incomes in central Compton, 2.3 miles south of Watts, are incarcerated on a single day.” Id. at 3.
3. Oscar Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, 215 SCI. AM. 19, 21 (1966).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. WILBUR ZELINSKY, THE CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED STATES 111 (rev. ed.
1993).
7. Id.
8. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Government, Geography, and Growth: The True Drivers of Economic
Development, 91 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 142, 148 (2012).
9. STAFF OF J. COMM. TAX’N, 115TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC LAW 11597 131, 316–17 (Jt. Comm. Print 2018).
10. Id.
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incentive for entrepreneurs may satisfy those motivated by self-interest.
The appeal across the aisle has made various forms of enterprise zone a
legislative inevitability over the years. Yet the provisions’ economic
effectiveness remains an open question.11
Already, news reports question who should land in OZ. The online
retail behemoth Amazon.com planned to relocate a headquarter office to
“Long Island City, the fast-gentrifying Queens neighborhood across the
East River from the skyscrapers of midtown Manhattan.”12 There, the
company was to enjoy the “Trump Tax Break” although the “[m]edian
income around Amazon’s planned campus is $130,000, poverty is half
the city average and new buildings were going up long before the tax
overhaul.”13 If the intent was to lift residents out of poverty, the reported
gentrifying effect would be inefficient.14 Nevertheless, the provision
follows a long history of geographically based taxation.
B. Overview
This Article will discuss the tax incentive zones in the context of
revenue legislation as developed in various locations through history.
While no particular provision of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) need
be reduced to any ancient antecedent, general principles may emerge
regarding the national collection of revenue wherever producers may
have been located. Whatever natural economies may have obtained,
increasing complexity was eventually governed by the rule of law. That
is, taxation always has been a diagnostic aspect of government inasmuch
as the revenue law indicates the extent of horizontal and vertical equity
in a national territory. In the end, fiscal geography may help describe the
extent to which an advanced economy is distributive.
This Article is organized as follows: Section II begins with the local
source of revenue.15 For reasons drawn from philosophy and social
science, historical examples of taxes illustrate this Article. At least
11. See Scott Eastman & Nicole Kaeding, Opportunity Zones: What We Know and What
We Don’t, TAX FOUND. 8 n.26 (Jan. 2019) (warning of the possibility that the incentivized
“investments generate employment opportunities that do not match the skills of existing
residents”).
12. Associated Press, Amazon’s NYC Home in “Opportunity Zone” for Trump Tax Break,
WTOP NEWS (Nov. 14, 2018, 1:18 AM), https://wtop.com/real-estate/2018/11/amazons-nychome-in-opportunity-zone-for-trump-tax-break/ [https://perma.cc/5CH2-4FD3].
13. Id.
14. Dan Weil, The Trump Administration Said These Tax Breaks Would Help Distressed
Neighborhoods. Who’s Actually Benefiting?, WASH. POST (June 6, 2019, 6:30 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/opportunity-zones-are-loaded-with-tax-benefits-butwill-they-actually-help-residents/2019/06/05/0f80e1c6-7e68-11e9-8bb7-0fc796cf2ec0_story.html
[https://perma.cc/9WYG-YUBL] (Although Amazon’s N.Y.C. plan dissolved, “experts”
continued to “worry that some of the investment may not benefit the intended targets.”).
15. See infra Section II.
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theoretically, if not archaeologically, pristine elements of taxation may
be isolated.
Then Section II continues with the question of what the government
must do to maintain the contributory capacity of the taxpayer
population.16 Whether glossed as taxation with representation, consent of
the governed, or otherwise, the fiscal state must contend with the rule of
law and distributive justice. This historical and philosophical context sets
the stage for OZ in Section III.17
If geographic and economic redistribution has always been a fiscal
function, then tax zone legislation may be the latest iteration. The various
statutes have combined the entrepreneurial spirit of the free market with
the impulse to relieve poverty in a legislatively ingenious, if internally
inconsistent, package. Empirically, the results have been modest at best,
with respect to either increase in commerce or decrease in unemployment
and poverty levels.18 The lasting effect may lie in law-makers’
predilection for demarcating zones.
Section IV delves into the perspective of the individuals involved.19
The modest take-up rate is a question of behavioral economics for the
entrepreneurial taxpayer. The tax incentive may not outweigh the
perceived cost of opening a business in the inner city or blighted
countryside. Given the business choice, the tax agency may serve as a
mirror. Under the incentive provision, the tax collector appears as a
collaborator rather than an adversary. This view allows Section IV to
characterize the tax official more fully. Just as the taxpayer is not merely
a rational actor, the tax collector is no fiscal automaton. Section IV adopts
the anthropological innovation of para-ethnography to capture the selfawareness of the collaborator.20 Where behavioral economics describes
taxpayer psychology, para-ethnography describes the bureaucratic praxis
of the tax authority. The coordinated actions of these individuals
operationalize the tax provisions.
Section V discusses the tax zone legislation in the context of world
historical industrial transformation.21 Incentives operate in an economic
context, inasmuch as the federal income tax never drove commerce away
from the zones in the first place. So-called urban blight and the Rust Belt
were casualties of global industrialization. Consequently, it should be no
surprise that tax incentives have not lured business back.

16. See infra Section II.
17. See infra Section III.
18. Opportunity Zones: Facts and Figures, ECON. INNOVATION GRP., https://eig.org/
opportunityzones/facts-and-figures/ [https://perma.cc/VU2X-DAZ2] (Jan. 2020).
19. See infra Section IV.
20. See infra Section IV.
21. See infra Section V.
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Section VI concludes as follows: Whatever the flaws of the particular
tax zone legislation, the provisions confirm the legislator’s intuition that
tax is geographically and economically redistributive.22 In this function,
the taxpayer and tax collector may behave as a complementary couple
rather than an adversarial pair. In the midst of today’s trans-Pacific
industrial revolution, the question is how much the fiscal apparatus can
stabilize the people’s life chances.23 This harks back to fundamental
questions of distributive justice attendant to the advent of “civilized
society.”24
II. HISTORICAL & PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND
To analyze taxation in its component parts, this Article begins with
the local source of revenue. Both historically and theoretically, tax law
applies to the productive taxpayer who has natural connections to home
and culture. In this regard, scholars have observed that “law and
ethnography are crafts of place: they work by the light of local
knowledge . . . . [A]nthropology and jurisprudence . . . are alike absorbed
with the artisan task of seeing broad principles in parochial facts.”25 This
Section weaves together the relevant principles of law and social
science.26 Incorporating the essentially parochial taxpayer into a national
economy has long been the problem of the social contract.27 Even where
the rule of law prevails, the maintenance of the taxpayer population raises
the issue of distributive justice. Among the historical responses to this
issue has been the extension of human rights from civil liberties to social
entitlements, to wit, the welfare state.28 While these governmental
responses have appeared in advanced economies, they had antecedents in
ancient civilizations.29 The apparatus of fiscal geography has been long
22. See infra Section VI.
23. Jan Breman, Int’l Inst. Soc. Stud. Erasmus Univ. Rotterdam, The Great Transformation
in the Setting of Asia, Address at the 57th Anniversary of the International Institute of Social
Studies 3 (Oct. 29, 2009), https://www.wiego.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/Breman_
Transformation.Asia_pdf [https://perma.cc/3H9P-KPQA].
24. Compañía Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87,
100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
25. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact & Law in Comparative Perspective, in
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETATIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167 (1st ed. 1983).
26. See generally Daniel Blocq & Maartje van der Woude, Making Sense of the Law &
Society Movement, 11 ERASMUS L. REV. 134 (2018) (“focus[ing] on the evolution of the Law and
Society Movement (L&S) – an important alternative site for the empirical study of law and legal
institutions”).
27. See SALLY FALK MOORE, POWER AND PROPERTY IN INCA PERU 1 (1st ed. 1958) (“How
was it possible for five million or more relatively primitive people to be organized under one
ruler? How were they taxed, how were they governed? These are questions which have been asked
since the 16th century and have, more often than not, been answered with extreme naíveté.”).
28. See discussion infra Section II.E.
29. E.g., id.
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in the making. The mechanism of national taxation with concomitant
redistribution lays the philosophical foundation for the latter-day zone
legislation.
A. The Local Source of Revenue
Throughout world history, civilizations arose where revenue flowed.30
Specifically, this meant the “geographical and social concentration of a
surplus product.”31 Where resources and agriculture were profitable, they
could generate revenue that became the “life-blood of government.”32 In
sum, government connects far-flung localities.
For example, anthropologists have studied taxation particularly in the
sixteenth century Inca Empire in South America. This empire
encompassed as many as five million people within a couple million
square kilometers.33 There, the source of wealth was epitomized by gold
and silver mines in the first instance, subject to “a local, rather than a
national control and exploitation.”34 Nevertheless, “[e]ach region
contributed what it specialized in geographically or professionally,”
whether in crops or skilled handicraft.35 Then those contributions “went
in part to Cuzco [the imperial capital]; in part to support the provincial
capital; in part to care for traveling armies and officials as they passed
through; in part to maintain newly settled mitimaes [the imperially
conscripted laborers], probably to support the local population when road
work was undertaken, and to maintain some of the poor and people too
old to do agricultural labor.”36 To recapitulate, minerals and arable land
gave rise to civilization extending beyond the local village, connected by
ties, including taxation.
The Inca case is not unique in this respect. It was preceded by other
primary examples, such as the South Asian civilization. Arising in the
fourth century BCE, the Mauryan dynasty ruled as many as fifty million
people in five million square kilometers (which then engulfed the original
city of Mohenjo Daro).37 According to Indian historians, “mines . . . were
owned by the state, and were . . . let out to entrepreneurs, from whom the
30. See CHARLES ADAMS, FOR GOOD & EVIL: THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE COURSE OF
CIVILIZATION xxi (2d ed. 1993).
31. David Harvey, The Right to the City, NEW LEFT REV. (2008), https://newleftreview
.org/issues/II53/articles/david-harvey-the-right-to-the-city [https://perma.cc/S7HK-9WXX].
32. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935).
33. See MOORE, supra note 27; Peter Turchin et al., East-West Orientation of Historical
Empires and Modern States, 12 J. WORLD-SYS. RSCH. 219, 222 tbl.1 (2006).
34. MOORE, supra note 27, at 40.
35. Id. at 124.
36. Id. at 34, 110–11.
37. Roger Boesche, Kautilya’s Arthaśastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India, 67 J.
MIL. HIST. 9, 12 (2003); Turchin et al., supra note 33, at 222.
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king claimed a percentage of their output as a royalty.”38 In this case, the
mineral resource was locally worked yet accrued to the benefit of the
larger kingdom.
The inception of civilization governing an expanse that was national
rather than local set forth fundamental issues of law and social science.
Production occurred through naturally local agriculture. National
collection and redistribution of revenue posed the problem of uniformity.
In the Inca example, the quipu, a counting device composed of knotted
cords (perhaps an American version of the abacus), has been featured in
the social science literature as an artifact of accounting.39 “[W]ell suited
to recording the kind of numerical information necessary for an extensive
tax and conscription program,” the quipu rendered a “universal method
throughout the empire . . . entirely feasible.”40 The quipu iconizes
national accountability over a population which is still tied to the land.
The Inca example shows how empires grow from villages. When their
army “conquered people already grouped in some political unit, the Inca
did not hesitate to employ the administrative machinery they found
already functioning.”41 Then, “the folk community was forcefully linked
both to a provincial capital and to Cuzco through the imposition of taxes,
the Sun cult [the national religion], the Quechua language and the court
and high government.”42 In anthropological terms, the connection
between the local community and the national institutions was codified
by culture. In sum, the “Inca political achievement is precisely in the
extension of local government methods to an empire.”43 The significance
of the Inca example lies in the pristine connection between the local and
the national.
Government on a national scale was inherently redistributive in scope.
For the local official, “tenure may have depended on his ability to extract
taxes.”44 Tribute came in the form of crops harvested from farms
“subdivided into small plots whose produce was allocated for many local
purposes and local deities, only a part going to provincial capitals and to
Cuzco, to support the official national religion of the realm.”45 Thus, a
local collector could have had the ability to divert revenue from imperial
to local purposes. In particular, anthropologists have documented that
“there were people who, by reason of not being in the family of an able38. A.L. BASHAM, THE WONDER THAT WAS INDIA: A SURVEY OF THE CULTURE OF THE
INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT BEFORE THE COMING OF THE MUSLIMS 101 (1954).
39. See JACOB BRONOWSKI, THE ASCENT OF MAN 101 (1973); CAROLYN WEBBER & AARON
WILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 39 (1986).
40. MOORE, supra note 27, at 102.
41. Id. at 122.
42. Id. at 26, 130.
43. Id. at 111.
44. Id. at 33.
45. Id. at 26.
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bodied man, or being able to work themselves, were supported by the
community.”46 Accordingly, redistribution was both geographic and
economic.
Again, the Inca example resonates with the evolution of civilizations
around the world. “After the Mauryan period,” for example, “it became
usual for kings to pay their officers and favourites not with cash, but with
the right to collect revenue from a village or group of villages.” 47 Tax
collection “often carried other privileges, and usually made the recipient
the intermediary between king and taxpayer.”48 Taxation implied
delegation.
The redistributive aspect came with the territory of an imperial
sovereign. Logistically, “the wider his empire the more power he must
delegate to others.”49 In particular, “[t]ax law tells much about the nature
of government, the price it exacted and the price it had to pay for selfmaintenance.”50 To maintain the loyalty of the population, the
government distributed and extracted.
Excessive extraction would have been self-defeating. Instead, the
Sanskrit text metaphorically cautioned that “the king should tax as a bee
sucks honey, without hurting the flower.”51 The taxpayer and tax
collector were symbiotic.
In effect, supralocal taxation spreads the wealth of local taxpayers.
Among the fifty states of the United States today, per capita federal
liability is progressive.52 In the richest state of Connecticut, the per capita
federal tax is $10,364, and in the poorest state, Mississippi, $2,883.53 In
American history, “the federal income tax has played a key role in
enabling the federal government to redistribute the nation’s resources in
a southward direction.”54 From each, the tax takes according to the ability
to pay.
The redistributive effect was no accident. From the inception of the
Federal income tax, “Southern politicians supported the Sixteenth
MOORE, supra note 27, at 25–26.
BASHAM, supra note 38, at 96.
Id.
MOORE, supra note 27, at 106.
Id. at 2.
BASHAM, supra note 38, at 109; KUNWAR DEO PRASAD, TAXATION IN ANCIENT INDIA:
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES UP TO THE GUPTAS 27 (1987). From 200 BCE, the Panchatantra taught,
“The king who tastes his kingdom like/Elixir, bit by bit/Who does not overtax its life,/Will fully
relish it,” VISHNU SHARMA, PANCHATANTRA 3–4, 83 (Arthur W. Ryder trans., Univ. Chi. Press
1925).
52. See Richard Barrington, Which States Pay the Most Federal Taxes?, MONEYRATES
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.money-rates.com/research-center/federal-income-taxes-by-state.htm
[https://perma.cc/QW6T-Y6V5].
53. Id.
54. Robin L. Einhorn, Look Away Dixieland: The South and the Federal Income Tax, 108
NW. U. L. REV. 773, 780 (2014).
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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Amendment because they believed that the South would benefit.”55 By
the time of the New Deal, Progressives advocated for redistribution from
the “Northeast” which they “understood essentially as a synonym for
industrial and financial capital.”56 After World War II, the income tax
enabled “the federal budget to operate as a mighty engine of geographical
redistribution.”57 The combination of these fiscal facts and the anti-tax
rhetoric mentioned below form an irony in American history.
Across the ideological spectrum, commentators have drawn their own
inferences. Since the Inca empire, national taxation along with
nationalized (royal) ownership of property (realty) have attracted labels
as both L’Empire socialiste des Inka and el estado feudal incaico.58 Even
today, advocates for nationalized land reform in privatized agrarian
economies ironically echo the “overt coercive apparatus” of pre-modern
“serfdom.”59 Redistribution may be alternatively socializing or
totalizing.60
B. Hypothetical Geography
In some respects, each civilization may be unique. At the same time,
scholars have long presupposed a primordial state from which political
evolution proceeded.61 “Thus in the beginning all the World was
America—even more so than America is now, because in the beginning
no such thing as money was known anywhere.”62 In these terms, the
eighteenth-century European Enlightenment looked to the New World
for a clean slate upon which to inscribe first principles.63 In South
America, before the Spanish arrival, it was true that the Quechuaspeaking people conducted a barter economy.64 From historical instances,
philosophers hypothesized an ideal state.65
Id. at 796.
Id. at 784.
Id. at 780.
MOORE, supra note 27, at 5. See generally LOUIS BAUDIN, A SOCIALIST EMPIRE: THE
INCAS OF PERU (Arthur Goddard ed., Katherine Woods trans., 1961).
59. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PLASTICITY INTO POWER: COMPARATIVEHISTORICAL STUDIES ON THE INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUCCESS
126 (1987).
60. See ERICH FROMM, THE FEAR OF FREEDOM 35 (1942) (“One was born into a certain
economic position which guaranteed a livelihood determined by tradition, just as it carried
economic obligations to those higher in the social hierarchy.”).
61. See, e.g., HARRY ECKSTEIN, REGARDING POLITICS: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THEORY,
STABILITY, AND CHANGE 81 (1992).
62. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. V § 49 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1689).
63. John A. Powell & Stephen M. Menendian, Remaking Law: Moving Beyond
Enlightenment Jurisprudence, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1035, 1055 (2010).
64. See MOORE, supra note 27, at 86.
65. Powell & Menendian, supra note 63, at 1037.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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Subsequently, anthropologists coined “pristine state” as a term of
material culture.66 When the ancient valleys of the Yellow, Nile, Indus,
Euphrates, and Tigris Rivers were yet untouched by other civilizations,
states “emerged from stratified societies and experienced the slow,
autochthonous growth of the specialized formal instruments of social
control out of their own needs for these institutions.”67 Additionally,
anthropologists introduced Mesoamerica, Andean South America, and
Polynesia as pristine states.68 As evidence and analysis advanced, the
concept of the pristine state became less pure.69 Nevertheless,
anthropologists still find comparison useful among archaeological sites
of indigenous development, especially in Yoruba and Benin as well as
those already mentioned above, including China, Egypt, India,
Mesopotamia, Zapotec, and Inca.70 Specifically in the Yellow River
Valley, the original city was engulfed by the Xia dynasty arising in 1800
BCE over 450 thousand square kilometers71 encompassing 13.5 million
people by the second century BCE.72 Although archaeology is different
from the philosophical ideal, this Article refers to examples from
civilizations around the world.
The comparability of civilizations throughout the world depends on
the circumstances. As noted above, geography comes to life through the
course of the historical movements of productive populations. In turn,
boundaries move. “A hundred years ago, the frontier between West and
East was located somewhere in the neighborhood of BosniaHerzegovina. Now it seems to run through every European city.”73 In
other words, people experience geography through culture.
Ancient, as well as modern, history reflects the cultural geography of
world civilizations. For instance, classical Greece, located in what is now
the European Union, had its significant “intellectual links” with the
“ancient Egyptians, Iranians and Indians” rather than the
66. See Henri J.M. Claessen, The Emergence of Pristine States, 15 SOC. EVOLUTION & HIST.
3, 4 (2016).
67. MORTON FRIED, EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL SOCIETY: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 231 (1967).
68. See generally ELMAN R. SERVICE, ORIGINS OF THE STATE AND CIVILIZATION: THE
PROCESS OF CULTURAL EVOLUTION (1975).
69. See Michael E. Smith, How Do Archaeologists Compare Early States?, 35 REVS.
ANTHROPOLOGY 5, 7 (2006).
70. See id. at 8 tbl.1; Claessen, supra note 66, at 23; see generally BRUCE G. TRIGGER,
UNDERSTANDING EARLY CIVILIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).
71. See Rein Taagepera, Size and Duration of Empires: Growth-Decline Curves, 3000 to
600 B.C., 7 SOC. SCI. RES. 180, 189 T.5 (1978).
72. U.N. HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, 2 MITIGATION, MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
OF FLOODS IN SOUTH ASIA 12 (2002).
73. NIALL FERGUSON, THE WAR OF THE WORLD: TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONFLICT AND THE
DESCENT OF THE WEST 645 (2006).
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contemporaneous Westerners.74 Historical affinities reflect a changed
economic order.
To be clear, the Inca empire was no egalitarian Eden. Rather, it was a
“conquest state,” comprised of pre-existing tribes colonized by military
force.75 Similarly, other pristine states also arose from war. From the sixth
century BCE, the Taittiriya Upanisad characterized the organic origin of
a kingdom in these terms, “[for] they who have no king cannot fight.”76
Here, history may falsify eighteenth century philosophy and conjecture.
Nowadays, political philosophers disclaim the state of nature. That
was not “an actual historical state of affairs, much less . . . a primitive
condition of culture.”77 Instead, the “original position” of equality is an
imagined pre-political status from which the provisions of the social
contract derive by hypothesis.78 The significance of the status lies in the
rationale for leaving it.
C. Social Contract
In a civilization or political society characterized in part by taxation,
revenue becomes a burden on the taxpayers. Assuming the original state
of objective equality, the question of tax fairness arises. Then “it is hard
to imagine . . . a successful income tax scheme on a voluntary basis,”
because the “suspicion that others are not honoring their duties and
obligations is increased by the fact that, in the absence of the authoritative
interpretation and enforcement of the rules, it is particularly easy to find
excuses for breaking them.”79 Consequently, uniform implementation
becomes imperative.
The moral implication was apparent at the outset. For example, the
sixth century BCE Buddhist monarch Mahasammata stated that the king
is entitled to tax his people only
if he protects them, and that he obtains in addition a share of
the religious merit acquired by them, especially by his
brahman subjects; if he fails in his duty he has no moral right
to receive tax, and reaps a share of all the demerit accruing
to his subjects.80
The tax collector had to remain on high moral ground for the taxpayer to
follow suit.
74. AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 397 (Harv. Univ. Press
expanded ed. 2017).
75. MOORE, supra note 27, at 121.
76. BASHAM, supra note 38, at 81.
77. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (Harv. Univ. Press 1971).
78. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 164 (Harv. Univ. Press 1986).
79. RAWLS, supra note 77, at 240.
80. BASHAM, supra note 38, at 109.
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A more calculated rationale for taxation is possible. A utilitarian
“thinks that income taxes are just only if they . . . contribute to the
greatest long-term happiness, and it does not matter to him whether or not
they take the property without the owner’s consent.”81 Some civilizations
may have been built in part on this premise.
On the other hand, that kind of calculus raises the question of vertical
equity. “An economy can be optimal in this sense even when some people
are rolling in luxury and others are near starvation as long as the starvers
cannot be made better off without cutting into the pleasures of the rich.”82
In short, the persistence of taxes and the government it feeds depends on
either coercion or consent.
D. Rule of Law & Distributive Justice
Assuming that consent is the desirable basis, taxation should come
under the rule of law. There is a range of literature on liberal legality, yet
the distinctive characteristic may be nomothetic order where even the
sovereign holding political power “feels bound by the law.”83
Accordingly, the New England counterparts to the eighteenth century
Enlightenment established a “government of laws and not of men.”84
When the British “Parliament proclaimed its sovereignty over the
colonies by retaining a tax on tea of threepence a pound,” the Bostonians
complained that taxation without representation is tyranny.85 Currently,
these historic slogans may be appropriated for anachronistic purposes, yet
the propositions stand. Pre-existing legislation can preclude dictatorship.
Nevertheless, the rule of law would not guarantee fairness. Nineteenth
century writers warned of the so-called “tyranny of the majority.”86
Twentieth-century contractarians conceded that “[t]here seems to be no
way to characterize a feasible procedure guaranteed to lead to just
legislation.”87 Similarly, “when an axiomatic structure, with reasonablelooking axioms, yields the existence of a dictator as an implication of
jointly chosen—individually plausible—axioms, this is readily
understood as a major embarrassment for that set of propositions.”88
Instead, the question of substantive justice arises.
81. DWORKIN, supra note 78, at 73.
82. SEN, supra note 74, at 68–69.
83. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER: FROM PREHUMAN TIMES TO THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 246 (2011).
84. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX (1780).
85. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 3 HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES: THE AGE OF
REVOLUTION 145 (1957).
86. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA pt. 2, ch. 7 (Harvey C.
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, eds. & trans., Univ. Chi. Press 2002) (1840).
87. RAWLS, supra note 77, at 360.
88. SEN, supra note 74, at 269.
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Where procedure falls short, substantive justice may begin. First
comes “the intuitively appealing principle of fairness that if one person
slices the cake and the other gets first pick the division of the cake will
be fair even if it is unequal.”89 Then comes the more subjective problem
of “how to consolidate individual intentions into a collective, group
intention.”90 Here, the hermeneutics of jurisprudence may be
unavoidable. It would be impossible to “ignore the questions about the
internal character of legal argument . . . like innumerate histories of
mathematics.”91 The rule of law must be internally consistent.
E. Social Entitlements
Extending the rule of law, subsistence, human, or social rights have
deep and widespread conceptual roots if not a pedigreed intellectual
genealogy. In fifth century BCE China, the Analects suggested that
“[r]iches and honors acquired by unrighteousness” were unjust.92 Wealth
(or lack thereof) has long been associated with justice (or lack thereof).93
Nowadays, economists describe this as vertical equity.94
Ancient civilizations developed social theories. In the third century
BCE, the Arthaśastra suggested that during “famine, the king shall show
favour to his people by . . . distributing either his own collection of
provisions or the hoarded income of the rich.”95 For the state to persist,
the population had to be maintained.
Similarly, legal penalties have long recognized wealth, poverty, or
socio-economic status. In the first century BCE, the Laws of Manu
prescribed penalties for theft proportionate to the caste of the thief, lowest
for the poorest. Thus, the “guilt of a Sudra shall be eightfold, that of a
Vaisya sixteenfold, that of a Kshatriya two-and-thirtyfold . . . That of a
Brahmana sixty-fourfold.”96 The punishment fit not only the crime but
the social station of the criminal.
At the dawn of the Christian Era, the underprivileged again rose to the
fore. The Bible emphasized “the least of these my brethren.”97 In the late
89. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 437 (3d ed. 1986).
90. DWORKIN, supra note 78, at 336.
91. Id. at 14.
92. CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS 25 (James Legge trans., Global Grey)
(1893).
93. Cf. Yan Xu, No Taxation Without Representation: China’s Taxation History & Its
Political-Legal Development, 39 HONG KONG L.J. 515 (2009).
94. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509, 580 (1986) (“vertical equity … refers to the distribution of costs and benefits across different
income groups”).
95. KAUTILIYA’S ARTHASHASTRA book IV, ch. III (R. Shamasastry trans. 1915).
96. THE LAWS OF MANU ch. VIII ¶¶ 337–38 (George Bühler trans., Oxford Clarendon Press
1886).
97. Matthew 25:40 (King James).
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twentieth century, an encyclical would revisit the proposition that “men
are obliged to come to the relief of the poor and to do so not merely out
of their superfluous goods. If one is in extreme necessity, he has the right
to procure for himself what he needs out of the riches of others.”98 Relief
from poverty was cast as a right.
Before the theory of consent by the governed, the support of the
population may have appeared as a practical consideration. Returning to
the Inca example, the pristine fiscal order was inclusive in an imperial
style.99 In particular, some “taxes harvested for the Inca were not even
taken to the provincial capital, but remained in local storehouses.”100
From there, the poor, “namely those members of the community too old
or ill to do agricultural labor,” were “supported in part by the Inca
storehouses, as was the whole local population in a year of famine.”101
Additionally, these “local stores were also used to maintain the
agriculturalists when they served in local segments of provincial or
national projects such as the building and repairing of storehouses, roads,
and irrigation works near their own communities.”102 As previously
observed, taxation was both economically and geographically
redistributive.103
In the Inca Empire, acts pursuant to subsistence were sanctioned.104
According to reported cases, the theft of food from a royal farm resulted
in the death penalty; likewise, theft out of vice was punishable by
torture.105 By contrast, theft because of poverty resulted in “slight
punishment” or pardon, while theft out of necessity when traveling on the
road was forgiven.106 While these legal cases are older, they were
precursors of what was to come.
Originally, the rule of law was associated with the Enlightenment.107
Then, the individual asserted rights as against the state.108 At the time of
the Industrial Revolution, the concept of the rule of law comported with
98. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES pt. II, ch. III, § 2 ¶ 69 (1965).
99. MOORE, supra note 27, at 106.
100. Id. at 62.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 25–26.
104. See id.
105. MOORE, supra note 27, at 171.
106. Id.
107. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM
OF SOCIAL THEORY 54 (1976) (“The legal order emerged with modern European liberal society.”);
History, DEMOCRACY WEB, http://www.democracyweb.org/rule-of-law-history [https://perma.cc/
A8MU-YA3X] (last visited July 31, 2021) (discussing “The Rule of Law as Bulwark Against
Government Tyranny”).
108. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION & RECONSTRUCTION xii (Yale
Univ. Press 1998) (acknowledging the “conventional” view that “[i]ndividual and minority rights
did constitute a motif of the Bill of Rights”).
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participation in the free market.109 At that point, the significant legal
rights were those applicable to civil society, or civil liberties, as
constitutionalized (for instance, the 1789 Bill of Rights).110 Civil rights
had yet to face expansion.111
After World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
stated:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and
necessary social services, and the right to security in the
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood,
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond
his control.112
Consequently, social entitlements became rights.113 The question is, then,
whether these rights are enforceable.
If the people in the original state could legislate a fair tax code,
hypothetically they would apply certain principles. Specifically, taxation
“can be justified only as promoting directly or indirectly the social
conditions that secure the equal liberties and as advancing in an
appropriate way the long-term interests of the least advantaged.”114 This
presumes objective (blind) equality.
Hypothetically, the fair tax code would develop detailed provisions.
For example, the fiscal regime could guarantee “a social minimum either
by family allowances and special payments for sickness and employment,
or more systematically by such devices as a graded income supplement
(a so-called negative income tax).”115 Soon after Professor Rawls made
this observation, the U.S. Congress enacted the earned income tax credit
(EITC), a refundable wage supplement for low-income workers and their
109. See, e.g., Com. v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111, 133 (1842) (“[Boston Glass Co.] acknowledges
the established principle, that every free man, whether skilled laborer, mechanic, farmer or
domestic servant, may work or not work, or work or refuse to work with any company or
individual, at his own option, except so far as he is bound by contract.”) (citing Boston Glass
Manufactory v. Binney, 21 Mass. 425 (1827)); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)

(Holmes, J. dissenting) (“It is settled by various decisions of this court that state constitutions and state
laws may regulate life in many ways which we as legislators might think as injudicious, or if you like
as tyrannical, as this, and which, equally with this, interfere with the liberty to contract.”).

110. See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
111. Civil Rights, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/civil_rights [https://
perma.cc/DC5W-PU6C] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
112. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25, ¶ 1 (Dec. 10,
1948).
113. See id.
114. RAWLS, supra note 77, at 332.
115. Id. at 275.
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children.116 Thus, future tax equity could have both historical and
philosophical foundations.
The rationale for social entitlements is that without them, civil rights
are hollow. The social entitlements include “the provision of living
conditions that are socially, technologically, and ecologically
safeguarded, insofar as the current circumstances make this necessary if
citizens are to have equal opportunities to utilize the civil rights.”117 As a
practical matter, the impecunious cannot enjoy rights like those to private
property.
For example, consider a contemporary case of implementation. In
Southeast Asia, Judge Pangalangan writes that international human rights
like those to health may be “advanced through domestic legislation,” yet
“have rarely given rise to justiciable rights.”118 In “a fragile democracy
like the Philippines, where State institutions are weak,” health “was
hitherto a family matter, and its burdens absorbed by the private sphere.
The international indicia assume that the costs are borne through social
security and health insurance, and properly shift them to the public
sphere.”119 To the extent that human rights encompass social
entitlements, they imply a need for development of the welfare state.
Thus, social justice obtains where the “poor and disadvantaged”
people have recourse to the rule of law.120 Conversely, the rule of law
would not accede to reading into “welfare and taxation schemes
provisions equality of resources would approve,” unless codified in the
legislation.121 Uniform implementation is still necessary.
The various historical sanctions may not form a direct lineage.
Nevertheless, precursors to social rights were widespread throughout
world civilizations. The social entitlements create “the much furtherreaching obligation for the state to use its power for the benefit of its
citizens, giving them a right to food, shelter, education,” and so forth.122
“Whether such needs should be formulated in the form of rights is a
question often debated, but practically speaking more or less settled in
116. See Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 30 § 204 (enacting the
predecessor to IRC § 32).
117. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 123 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996).
118. Raul C. Pangalangan, The Domestic Implementation of the International Right to
Health: The Philippine Experience, in ADVANCING THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH 155 (José M.
Zuniga et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2013).
119. Id.
120. Adriaan Bedner & Jacqueline A.C. Vel, An Analytical Framework for Empirical
Research on Access to Justice, L. SOC. JUST. & GLOBAL DEV. J. 7 (Feb. 6, 2011), https://warwick
.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2010_1/bedner_vel/bedner_vel.pdf [https://perma.cc/XCC5-Q2TG].
121. DWORKIN, supra note 78, at 404.
122. Adriaan Bedner, An Elementary Approach to the Rule of Law, 2 HAGUE J.R.L. 48, 66
(2010).
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favour with the adoption of these rights into international rights treaties
and many constitutions worldwide.”123 A century ago, the “richer
countries devoted one percent of their wealth to supporting children, the
poor, and the aged; today they spend almost a quarter of it.”124
Philosophically, these social rights may be grounded on the concept of
blind justice that favors the least advantaged.
F. Summary
History established redistribution as a fundamental fiscal function.
From the parochial location of the taxpayer, redistribution was inevitable
when states imposed national tax law. Philosophically, the original
position of blind equality may have served to naturalize the social
contract. Rather than interventions in the hypothetically free market, the
organic precursors to socio-economic entitlements may have been the
redistributive mechanisms to maintain the productive taxpayer
population. Ancient civilizations exemplified geographic as well as
economic redistribution. In national taxation, the Inca made efforts “to
keep the burden from falling more heavily on one community than
another, and demands which could be distributed equally or borne in turn
were dealt with this way.”125 Meanwhile, “[l]ocal building and road
projects were financed locally, though done in the name of the Inca and
Sun” national religion.126 Thus, geographically sensitive taxation had
prehistoric antecedents.
III. LAND OF OPPORTUNITY
In North Atlantic history, the usage of geography followed the needs
of the state as it had in other world civilizations. In early twentiethcentury Britain, for example, the “activities of the Royal Geographical
Society” supported “the technics and mechanics of the management of
Empire.”127 By the end of the Century, “[g]eographers now seek, by and
large, to contribute to what can best be called ‘the technics and mechanics
of urban, regional and environmental management.’”128 The latter may
account for the origin of the concept of the enterprise zone in urban
planning.
This Section traces the enterprise zone from concept to tax legislation.
Harking back to the Enlightenment concept of the state of nature, this
123. Id.
124. STEVEN PINKER, ENLIGHTENMENT NOW: THE CASE FOR REASON, SCIENCE, HUMANISM,
AND PROGRESS 322 (2018).
125. MOORE, supra note 27, at 67.
126. Id. at 68.
127. DAVID HARVEY, What Kind of Geography for What Kind of Public Policy?, in SPACES
OF CAPITAL: TOWARDS A CRITICAL GEOGRAPHY 27, 30 (2001).
128. Id.
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zone was a kind of hypothetically free market.129 On islands or oases
around the world, commerce was to flourish unfettered by tax or other
laws. Ironically, the delineation of the zone was a legislative act.
Revisiting the historical and philosophical background, consider the
following: In England, the classical political economists had referred to
“a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their
possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of
nature.”130 Even then, the rule of law enforced property and contractual
obligations between private parties.
The ideology of free trade has been authoritatively commemorated in
the West.131 Nowadays, economic historians acknowledge a greater
extent of government support for markets. Starting in the seventeenth
century, the “creation of global markets for spices, textiles, coffee, tea
and sugar were the work of monopoly companies like the Dutch and
English East Indian companies, simultaneously0020engaged in a
commercial and a naval contest for market shares.”132 The English effort
was “intimately linked to the expansion of British imperial power.”133
Then the British Crown supported the “successful creation of the world’s
largest textile market and cotton-supply chains in the 18th century, which
made the nationwide adoption of the spinning jenny and factory system
profitable and inevitable.”134 In the nineteenth century, U.S. tax subsidies
“drove much of the industrialization of this country, especially the
creation of the railroad industry.”135 Twentieth-century social scientists
depicted economic development as a “take-off” that they could
engineer.136 Since inception, the free market was an artifact of the social
contract.
Who pays for the free market? Today, economists observe that the
“‘free’ market is not free. It is a fundamental public good that is extremely
costly to create.”137 This is particularly relevant to the current
industrialization in China. Organized as the People’s Republic in 1949,
China is now the most populous country with 1.38 billion people in 9.6
129. See Bruce Bartlett, Enterprise Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Muddled, 142 TAX
NOTES 331, 332 (2014).
130. LOCKE, supra note 62, at ch. II, § 4.
131. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A
NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1976).
132. NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE PRICE OF AMERICA’S EMPIRE 185 (2004).
133. Id.
134. See Yi Wen, THE MAKING OF AN ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER: UNLOCKING CHINA’S SECRET
OF RAPID INDUSTRIALIZATION xii (2016).
135. See Kary L. Moss, The Privatizing of Public Wealth, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 106
(1995).
136. W.W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO
36 (1960).
137. Wen, supra note 134, at 11.
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million square kilometers.138 Per capita, China’s gross domestic product
(GDP) is $16,700.139 Of GDP, 21.3 percent is captured by tax or other
revenue.140 This is the powerhouse of the ongoing trans-Pacific industrial
revolution, supported by the “mercantilist” stance of the PRC.141 The
affirmative creation of the free market may have become a cosmopolitan
understanding. If so, the legislation of the enterprise zone forms a logical
outgrowth.
Just as the state of nature may never have existed, the free market was
a hypothetical condition. By the twenty-first century, American social
scientists could observe that capitalism “has lost its capitalists: too much
investment is tied up in ‘gray capital,’ controlled by institutional
managers who seek safe returns for retirees.”142 This would pose the
entrepreneurial question as under the tax zone incentives: whether
corporate investment is the appropriate target.
Inspired by British urban planning, the American tax bills began with
relief of economic distress. On one hand, the bills may have contributed
to redistributive welfare; on the other hand, their intention was to unleash
free enterprise. Over several iterations, the Federal legislation layered
incentives to conduct business in distressed areas. In turn, these extended
to zones struck by terrorism or natural disaster as well as market failure.
While the tax relief may have increased employment, it likewise may
have raised rent or the cost of living.143 Through numerous economic
studies cited below, the net effect on impoverished residents has been
modest at best. Nevertheless, the popularity of tax zones has not
diminished among legislators. In part, this may be due to the enduring
conceptual attraction to the state of nature.
A. Enterprise Zone
The predecessor of OZ was a brainchild of urban planners.144
Geographically, “it was Hong Kong’s example,” which “gave birth to the
enterprise zone,” or, in other words, a “tax- and regulation-free
138. See The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/theworld-factbook/ [https://perma.cc/XZN3-WHU3] (last visited July 29, 2021).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Wen, supra note 134, at 59.
142. See PINKER, supra note 124, at 329.
143. See Jennifer Forbes, Note, Using Economic Development Programs as Tools for Urban
Revitalization: A Comparison of Empowerment Zones & New Markets Tax Credits, 57 UNIV. ILL.
L. REV. 177, 199 (2006).
144. See Robert W. Benjamin, The Kemp-Garcia Enterprise Zone Bill: A New, Less Costly
Approach to Urban Redevelopment, 9 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 659, 660 (1981); David L. Callies &
Gail M. Tamashiro, Enterprise Zones: The Redevelopment Sweepstakes Begins, 15 URB. L. 231,
233 (1983).
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commercial zone.”145 If these Southeast Asian islands were a kind of
natural experiment in the free-market economy, urban planners modeled
the zone as an area for “all kinds of initiative, with minimal governmental
interference or control.”146 Since the initial suggestion in the British
urban planning literature a few decades ago, various kinds of zones have
been promulgated in Europe and America, including the Netherlands and
the United States.147 A brief comparative profile of the several countries
just mentioned will be instructive.
Hong Kong is an island of 1,108 square kilometers.148 Hong Kong
became part of the Qin Empire in the third century BCE, before
occupation by the United Kingdom from 1842 to 1997.149 Now, the
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, Hong
Kong has a population of 7.2 million, a per capita GDP of $61,400, and
revenue of 23 percent of GDP.150
By the fourteenth century, a Malay trading port existed on the 719
square kilometers of Singapore.151 In 1819, the United Kingdom
occupied Singapore, which joined the Malaysian Federation in 1963 but
became independent in 1965.152 Now the population of 5.9 million enjoys
a per capita GDP of $94,100.153 Revenue amounts to 15.7 percent of
GDP.154
In 1707, the United Kingdom incorporated England and Wales with
Scotland.155 The British Isles now occupy more than 243 thousand square
kilometers with a population of 65.6 million people.156 The per capita
GDP is $44,300 while revenue is 39.1 percent of GDP.157
In 1579, the Union of Dutch Provinces declared independence from
the Hapsburg monarchy in Spain.158 In 1815, the Dutch formed the
Kingdom of the Netherlands.159 After the 1830 secession of the Kingdom
145. Callies & Tamashiro, supra note 144, at 233
146. Peter Hall, Enterprise Zones: British Origins, American Adaptations, 7 BUILT ENV’T 5,
6 (1981).
147. See Jeffrey M. Euston, Clinton’s Empowerment Zones: Hope for the Cities or a Failing
Enterprise, 3 KANS. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 140, 141 (1994).
148. See World Factbook, supra note 138, at Hong Kong.
149. Yi-Zheng Lian, Is Hong Kong Really Part of China?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018),
nytimes.com/2018/01/01/opinion/hong-kong-china.html [https://perma.cc/4EY6-8MET].
150. World Factbook, supra note 138, at Hong Kong.
151. World Factbook, supra note 138, at Singapore.
152. Id.; see also CHURCHILL, supra note 85, at 277.
153. World Factbook, supra note 138, at Hong Kong.
154. Id.
155. CHURCHILL, supra note 85, at 54.
156. World Factbook, supra note 138, at United Kingdom.
157. See id.
158. See John Lothrop Motley, 3 RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC: A HISTORY 411 (N.Y.,
Harper & Bros. Publishers 1856).
159. World Factbook, supra note 138, at Netherlands.
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of Belgium, Holland occupies 41.5 thousand square kilometers and is
home to 17.2 million people.160 The per capita GDP is $53,900 while
revenue takes up 43.4 percent of GDP.161
In 1776, the thirteen North American colonies declared independence
from the United Kingdom.162 The United States expanded westward to
encompass fifty states and over 9.8 million square kilometers by 1959.163
As the third-largest country, the U.S. population is 335 million.164 The
per capita GDP is $62,530 while revenue as a percentage of GDP is only
17 percent (22 percent including Social Security).165
To compare these five countries: three are insular or archipelagic; one
is continental; one is a city-state; two are constitutional monarchies; one
is a republic; one is a semi-autonomous province of a communist state—
yet four are sovereign nation-states. The five countries are all subject to
the various effects of physical geography, such as the ecological volatility
associated with tropical rather than temperate latitude, or the fact that in
“most countries, people cluster near coasts and navigable rivers.”166 In
both Hong Kong and Singapore, the marine location for entrepots may
have been as attractive to commercial transshipment as their regulatory
status. Despite the heterogenous physical and political geography, all
these countries impose tax regimes that may be legally comparable.
For example, in 1996 the Netherlands enacted a special measure for
metropolitan problems.167 This rule authorized cities to designate
kansenzones (Opportunity Zones).168 Among other municipal benefits,
reduction of property tax was a potential incentive.169 At least among the
countries profiled above, a comparatively high tax burden prevails in
Holland, making tax reduction attractive there. Across heterogeneous
jurisdictions, zones of tax relief remain popular.170 In a kind of binary
opposition, those zones support taxation as an overall structure.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. The Declaration of Independence, 1776, OFF. HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/
milestones/1776-1783/declaration [https://perma.cc/9C9Y-9W5H] (last visited Feb. 26, 2020).
163. See World Factbook, supra note 138, at United States; Eric Foner & John A. Garraty
eds. READER’S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 1025 (Eric Foner & John A. Garraty, eds.,
1991).
164. See World Factbook, supra note 138, at United States
165. Id.
166. Sachs, supra note 8; See Jeffrey D. Sachs, Tropical Underdevelopment 1 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8119, 2001).
167. F.A.M. HOBMA & P. JONG, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS 11
n.23 (2016).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. For example, the Zones Franches Urbaines incentivize costly relocation. See Thierry
Mayer et al., The Impact of Urban Enterprise Zones on Establishments’ Location Decisions:
Evidence from France, 17 CATH. UNIV. LOUVAIN J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 709, 710 (2015).
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B. Federal Legislation
In America, tax incentives have a long history.171 During the
nineteenth century Industrial Revolution, state tax exemptions were
“aimed at specific industries and regions, [and] were the ideological
predecessors of the enterprise zone.”172 Now that industry has waned in
many places, the zones have had a series of reincarnations. In 1989, a
survey of state enterprise zones concluded that the states benefited from
job growth, especially in the inner cities and other areas that otherwise
would have suffered from low employment.173 Enterprise zones were yet
to enter federal legislation.
At the end of the twentieth century, members of Congress introduced
a series of bills.174 In 1992, economists speculated about “the likely
effects of some of the proposed federal EZ initiatives” based on “the U.S.
state and British experiences,” particularly that “limited U.S. survey
evidence . . . indicates that start-up firms average about 25 percent of
‘new’ zone businesses.”175 Whatever the uncertainty, President Bill
Clinton, “in response to the Los Angeles Riots,” the inner city unrest that
year, “offered a variation of former legislative proposals.” 176 Then
Congress adopted the enterprise zone bill.
Congress enacted Empowerment Zones within the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA ’93).177 The legislative history
acknowledged that the “Internal Revenue Code does not contain general
rules that target specific geographic areas for special Federal income tax
treatment.”178 Forbearance from targeting comported with uniformity in
taxation and federal law generally. Constitutionally, “all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”179 Otherwise,
pre-existing provisions of tax law favored Puerto Rico and the other
territorial possessions of the U.S. but arguably reflected their suzerain
political status as much as their insular locations.180 Expressly geographic
tax zones were new.
171. See Kary L. Moss, The Privatizing of Public Wealth, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 106
(1995).
172. Benjamin, supra note 144, at 672-73.
173. See RODNEY A. ERICKSON ET AL., PA. ST. UNIV., CTR. FOR REG’L BUS. ANALYSIS,
ENTERPRISE ZONES: AN EVALUATION OF STATE GOVERNMENT POLICIES 103 (1989).
174. See Benjamin, supra note 144 at 661, 674.
175. Leslie E. Papke, What Do We Know About Enterprise Zones?, 7 TAX POL’Y & ECON.
37, 62 (1993).
176. Forbes, supra note 143, at 183.
177. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 543.
178. Legislative History of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, H.R. REP. NO.
102-1034, at 690 (1993).
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
180. See Ellen P. Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1347 (1993).
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Nevertheless, the Congress noted that “low-income housing credit
[LIHTC] and qualified mortgage bond provisions target certain
economically distressed areas.”181 As of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA ’86), credit had been allocable by state housing agencies toward
investors in the cost-basis of the residences of low-income tenants.182
From 1987–1991, LIHTC was worth $3,246 million as estimated in
foregone Federal revenue.183 Three decades later, commentators would
question the efficiency of a tax provision that may have benefited
landlords as much as tenants.184
In the same legislation, Congress authorized state and local mortgage
revenue bonds.185 These bonds would generate tax-free interest, in the
manner of so-called municipal bonds, where the issuer would lend the
proceeds to purchasers of homes in low-income Census tracts or other
economically distressed areas.186 Thus, the previous legislation had
targeted poor neighborhoods without delineating geographic zones.
C. Zone of Empowerment
The first legislative iteration of a zone of empowerment focused on
local entrepreneurs. In creating Empowerment Zones or Enterprise
Communities out of Census tracts that had significant poverty rates,
Congress stated: “[r]evitalization of economically distressed areas
through expanded business and employment opportunities, especially for
residents of those distressed areas, should help alleviate both economic
and social problems, including distress resulting from narcotics and
crime.”187 This is because “[i]ncome taxes . . . represent a current cost
only if the business is profitable.”188 Nevertheless, tax incentives were
the federal answer to local poverty and unrest.
181. H.R. REP. NO. 102-1034, at 690 (1993).
182. See I.R.C. § 42 (2019).
183. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT of 1986 1361 tbl.A-2.II (Comm. Print 1987).
184. See Laura Sullivan & Meg Anderson, Affordable Housing Program Costs More,
Shelters Fewer, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 9, 2017, 12:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2017/05/09/527046451/affordable-housing-program-costs-more-shelters-less [https://perma.cc/
DH8F-9FKU] (stating that “This program has been described as a subterranean ATM, and only
the developers know the PIN.”); Chris Edwards & Vanessa Brown Calder, Kill the Loopholes,
Including the One for ‘Low-Income Housing,’ WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2017, 6:47 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/kill-the-loopholes-including-the-one-for-low-income-housing-150
5774844 [https://perma.cc/M7JL-UGXY]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-784T,
LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT: ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT &
ACCOUNTABILITY (2017).
185. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-1034, at 690 (1993).
186. See IRC § 143.
187. Legislative History of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, H.R. REP. NO.
103-111, at 791 (1993).
188. Aprill, supra note 180, at 1356.
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The Empowerment Zones were located around the country. Initially,
the urban zones included: Atlanta, Georgia; Baltimore, Maryland;
Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; New York, New York;
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Camden, New Jersey.189 Then the rural
zones included: Kentucky Highlands, Kentucky; Mid-Delta, Michigan;
and Rio Grande Valley, Texas.190 These were the sites of quantified
poverty.
One question was how to keep the economic benefits in these Zones.
OBRA ’93 contained an “anti-churning” clause.191 This clause concerned
the state governor who applied to the Secretary of Housing & Urban
Development (HUD) or of Agriculture for an urban or rural designation,
respectively.192 The governor was to propose a strategic plan that inter
alia would refrain from assistance with relocation except in the case of a
new branch of a business that essentially would not compete against
existing employers.193 Notwithstanding this requirement of the state plan,
it remained unclear whether the legislation authorized the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) to deny a tax claim from a relocated business.
With respect to the taxpayer, the effect of the state plan may have been
merely precatory. Moreover, the original concept of enterprise zones was
to attract commerce to otherwise unattractive locales.194
In the Empowerment Zones, businesses enjoyed tax reductions.
Employers received a 20-percent credit on up to $15,000 of the wages
paid to each employee in the Zone.195 Business owners received a
$35,000 increase to the allowance for immediate expensing which
covered otherwise depreciable assets.196 Private business activity could
benefit from tax-exempt financing through state or municipally issued
exempt facility bonds.197 From 1994 to 1998, the value of these benefits
was $2.492 billion.198 In sum, the incentives were to employ and invest
in infrastructure.

189. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV’T, INTERIM ASSESSMENT OF THE EZ/EC PROGRAM: A
PROGRESS REPORT 1 n.2 (2001).
190. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., INCENTIVES FOR DISTRESSED
COMMUNITIES: EMPOWERMENT ZONES & RENEWAL COMMUNITIES 3 n.10 (2009).
191. See Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Empowerment Zones & Enterprise Communities Under
OBRA ’93: A Promising Concept with some Modifications, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 345, 349 (1995).
192. See I.R.C. § 1391(e).
193. See I.R.C. § 1391(f)(2)(F).
194. See Audrey McFarlane, Empowerment Zones: Urban Revitalization Through
Collaborative Enterprise, 5 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV’T L. 35, 36 (1995).
195. See I.R.C. § 1396.
196. See I.R.C. § 1397A.
197. See I.R.C. § 1394.
198. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 103D CONG., SUMMARY OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF
OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993 39 app. A.II.G (Comm. Print 1993).
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In particular, the employer credit was the job incentive. Rather than
offering jobs or income directly to the employees, the legislation credited
the job creator. This mechanism ensured that the federal subsidy
supported the “deserving poor” who worked.199 Harking back to the
Enlightenment theory, the provision favored labor as the source of added
value.200 Despite the significant cost in foregone federal revenue, it
remained unclear whether the various provisions would be enough to
create a free market oasis.
Additionally, the legislation offered direct grants. In particular,
OBRA ’93 authorized social service block grants administered by the
States.201 Nevertheless, critics on both ends of the spectrum faulted the
legislation where the distressed zones still needed capital.202 Tax relief
and even social service may have been an inapposite response to those
who lacked money.203
In 1997, urban planners evaluated certain state and federal provisions.
They wrote that neither “tax incentives, nor nontax incentives, nor
enterprise zone incentives operate to offset the effects of basic state-local
tax systems. The locations that offer the highest returns without
incentives are pretty much the locations with the highest returns after
incentives are included.” 204 Evidently, this reported ineffectiveness did
not deter legislation that year.
In the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TpRA ’97), Congress extended
similar incentives.205 These covered impoverished Census tracts in the
District of Columbia, to be known as the D.C. Enterprise Zone
(DCEZ).206 There the provisions included the following: Employers
received the 20-percent wage credit.207 Business owners received the
$35,000 increase to the allowance for immediate expensing.208 Private
business activity could benefit from certain tax-exempt bonds issued by

199. See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit & the Limitations of Tax-Based
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 538 n.13 (1995).
200. See LOCKE, supra note 62, at ch. V § 27. ADAM SMITH, 1 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
& CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 5 (Edwin Cannan, ed., Methuen & Co. 1904) (1776);
FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE PART PLAYED BY LABOUR IN THE TRANSITION FROM APE TO MAN 7 (1876).
201. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397–1397n-13.
202. See Euston, supra note 147, at 146–48.
203. See generally JAMES FERGUSON, GIVE A MAN A FISH: REFLECTIONS ON THE NEW
POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION (2015).
204. Peter S. Fisher & Alan H. Peters, Tax & Spending Incentives & Enterprise Zones, NEW
ENGLAND ECON. REV. 109, 128 (1997).
205. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788.
206. See I.R.C. § 1400 (2010) (repealed 2018).
207. See I.R.C. § 1400(d) (2010) (repealed 2018).
208. See I.R.C. § 1400(a)(2) (2010) (repealed 2018).
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D.C.209 These provisions were worth $582 million in foregone federal
revenue.210
Additionally, capital gain became tax-free. Technically, a 0-percent
rate applied to gain on the sale of qualified DCEZ business assets held
for more than five years.211 This provision was worth $502 million in
foregone federal revenue.212 In short, the incentives were to invest,
expand, and sell an enterprise.
For individuals, the provisions included the following: A moderateincome taxpayer purchasing his or her first home in D.C. could receive
up to $5,000 in tax credit.213 The latter provision assumed that the
homebuyer generated enough income tax to use the credit. While the
former provisions were to benefit business, this credit could attract
middle-class homeowners. This provision was worth $74 million in
foregone federal revenue.214
Moreover, TpRA ’97 created a tax-credit bond. The qualified zone
academy bond (QZAB) was an alternative to tax-exempt bonds.215 The
legislation allowed to the QZAB holder a credit, rather than an exclusion
of interest, at a rate permitting issuance without discount or interest
cost.216 Given a ten percent private business contribution, state and local
governments could incur interest-free debt to support elementary or high
schools.217 In effect, the Treasury paid the bondholders by reducing the
federal liability that they otherwise had accrued. The legislation allocated
$400 million annually for a decade as the face amount of QZABs to be
issued by the states in proportion to their impoverished populations.218
The credit mechanism corresponded dollar-for-dollar to the bondholder’s
investment return. Yet tax-credit bonds retained the inefficiency of taxexempt bonds by subsidizing wealthy investors as well as pupils in the
needy zone.219
Ironically, the ineffectiveness of the original Empowerment Zone
legislation was confirmed. The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of
2000 (CRTRA ’00) extended the provisions in Zones that remained
economically distressed.220 The available tax incentives were similar to
209. See I.R.C. § 1400A (2010) (repealed 2018).
210. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997 519 (Comm. Print 1997).
211. See I.R.C. § 1400B (2010) (repealed 2018).
212. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 210, at 519.
213. See I.R.C. § 1400C (repealed 2018).
214. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 210, at 519.
215. See I.R.C. § 1397E (2016) (repealed 2017).
216. See I.R.C. § 1397E(a) (2016) (repealed 2017).
217. See I.R.C. § 1397E(d) (2016) (repealed 2017).
218. See I.R.C. § 1397E(e) (2016) (repealed 2017).
219. See DANIEL L. SIMMONS ET AL., FED. INCOME TAX’N 269 (7th ed. 2017).
220. See Consolidated Appropriations—FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.
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those in the original legislation. Employers received the wage credit in
the amount of fifteen percent.221 Business owners received the $35,000
increase to the allowance for immediate expensing.222 The zero percent
rate applied to gain on the sale of qualified business assets held for more
than five years.223 Additionally, CRTRA ’00 created an incentive for
building in the commercial revitalization zone by allowing either a
deduction of half the expenses or a ten year amortization.224 Toward this
end, the legislation allocated $12 million per state annually for 8 years.225
Innovatively, CRTRA ’00 enacted the New Markets Tax Credit
(NMTC).226 This provision was essentially an incentive to invest in lowincome Census tracts.227 In foregone federal revenue, the estimated cost
was $4.391 billion over a decade.228
In 2001, the Department of Housing & Urban Development (HUD)
reported on the Empowerment Zones.229 Job growth occurred, while the
number of resident- and minority-owned businesses increased
substantially.230 In the late 1990s, business boomed across the country,
but it was unclear if the tax incentives were the cause. Of the businesses
in the Zones, only eleven percent reported using the employment credits,
four percent reported using the expensing provision, and three percent
reported using Work Opportunity Tax Credits (WOTC), while sixty-five
percent of all the businesses reported no benefits of location in the
Zone.231 The report did “not reach definitive conclusions.”232
At this point, Congress had enacted a couple of iterations of tax zone
legislation that recognized zones of poverty by attempting to attract
investors. The provisions were a novel use of taxation to effectuate
redistribution, a recurring theme throughout world history. At the same
time, the legislation neither pulled the residents out of the impoverished
zone nor granted them seed capital.233
See I.R.C. § 1400H (repealed 2018).
See I.R.C. § 1400J (repealed 2018).
See I.R.C. § 1400F (repealed 2018).
See I.R.C. § 1400I (repealed 2018).
See I.R.C. § 1400I(d) (repealed 2018).
See I.R.C. § 45D.
See I.R.C. § 45D(e).
STAFF OF J. COMM. TAX’N, 107TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION
ENACTED IN THE 106TH CONG. 188 app. at 188, JCS-2-01 (Comm. Print 2001).
229. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/RCED-98-203, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT:
INFORMATION ON THE USE OF EMPOWERMENT ZONE AND ENTERPRISE COMMUNITY TAX INCENTIVES
(1998).
230. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV’T, supra note 189, at ii.
231. Id. at iii.
232. Id. at Foreword.
233. See BRUCE K. MULOCK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20381, EMPOWERMENT
ZONE/ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: OVERVIEW OF ROUNDS I, II & III (2002).
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
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D. Zones of Crisis
Then the Congress was overtaken by geopolitical events. The Job
Creation & Worker Assistance Act of 2002 (JC&WAA ’02) created the
New York Liberty Zone—not to remedy endemic poverty—but to help
rebuild after the terrorist hijacking that destroyed the World Trade Center
on September 11, 2001.234 At the same time, this tax bill delineated a
geographic zone.
In New York City, the legislation enhanced several pre-existing
provisions by: increasing WOTC (i.e. the credit to employers for wages
paid);235 allowing thirty percent additional depreciation;236 accelerating
depreciation recovery periods especially for commercial leaseholds;237
allocating $8 billion toward realty bonds;238 expanding the availability of
advance refunding bonds;239 widening the scope of the immediate
expense deduction;240 and extending from two to five years the period for
deferral of gain on involuntary conversion.241 The estimated cost of the
New York Liberty Zone was $5.029 billion in federal revenue to be
foregone over a decade.242 These provisions reflected a private-public
partnership to rebuild commercial real estate.
Despite sympathy for the victims, critics faulted the legislation. Legal
scholars commented that “it would be difficult to find five square miles
on earth less in need of enhanced development incentives than the
southern tip of Manhattan, which has a credible claim to being the
business and financial capital of the planet.”243 This observation echoes
the inefficiency concern with previous provisions, such as LIHTC or taxadvantaged bonds, which benefited the investors as well as the lowincome beneficiaries.

234. Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21.
This followed the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–134, which
offered tax reduction to affected individuals without delineating a geographic zone for purposes
of this Article.
235. See I.R.C. § 1400L(a) (repealed 2018).
236. See I.R.C. § 1400L(b) (repealed 2018).
237. See I.R.C. § 1400L(c) (repealed 2018).
238. See I.R.C. § 1400L(d) (repealed 2018).
239. See I.R.C. § 1400L(e) (repealed 2018).
240. See I.R.C. § 1400L(f) (repealed 2018).
241. See I.R.C. § 1400L(g) (repealed 2018).
242. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 107TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 107TH CONG. 326 app. (2003).
243. Ellen P. Aprill & Richard Schmalbeck, Post-Disaster Tax Legislation: A Series of
Unfortunate Events, 56 DUKE L.J. 51, 77 (2006).
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Thereafter, empirical research on the effect of various tax zone
programs reflected incomplete results.244 In 2003, economists reported
that state incentives “tend to increase the rate of business failures in the
target areas, offsetting their positive impact in attracting new businesses
in the target areas and favoring the growth of EZ businesses that remain
on the market.”245 This was the paradoxical result of a policy premised at
least in part on displacement.
In 2004, scholars conducted research in various states. The state
‘‘[z]ones did lead to new business activity inside the zones. The number
of births [of new businesses] and employment, payroll, and shipments
due to those births all increased significantly in the zones postdesignation.’’246 The incidence of new business was consistent with prior
evaluation. In California, ‘‘the enterprise zone designation raises
employment growth about three percent each year during the first six
years after the designation,” although “this effect does not persist in later
years. The number of employees at each business in an enterprise zone
also rises more than employment at businesses that do not have the same
tax incentives.’’247 At least according to these studies of local programs,
the net effect was positive.
Another external event ushered in the next major bill. In the wake of
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of
2005 (GOZA ’05) turned the parishes and counties designated by the
federal disaster declaration—some of which were already
impoverished—into a tax haven of sorts.248
After the legislation of the New York Liberty Zone, GOZA ’05 poses
the question whether tax relief should be the response to disaster.
Historically, taxation has been redistributive. Metaphorically, the
contributions of highland compatriots could balance those of flooded
lowlanders. As civilizations progress, “a richer and more technologically
advanced society can prevent natural hazards from becoming human
catastrophes.”249 Here, aid to devastated areas by the federal government
may be viewed as an implicit form of insurance—the country as a whole
244. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-03-1102, TAX ADMINISTRATION:
INFORMATION IS NOT AVAILABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER $5 BILLION IN LIBERTY ZONE TAX
BENEFITS WILL BE REALIZED 2 (2003).
245. Daniele Bondonio, Do Tax Incentives Affect Local Economic Growth? What Mean
Impacts Miss in the Analysis of Enterprise Zone Policies, CTR. ECON. STUD., Sept. 2003, at 5.
246. Robert Greenbaum & John B. Engberg, The Impact of State Enterprise Zones on Urban
Manufacturing Establishments, 23 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 315 (2004).
247. Suzanne O’Keefe, Job Creation in California’s Enterprise Zones: A Comparison Using
a Propensity Score Matching Model, 55 J. URB. ECON. 131 (2004).
248. See Gulf Zone Opportunity Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-135, 119 Stat. 2577. This
added to and codified provisions similar to those in the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73.
249. PINKER, supra note 124, at 187.
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acts to spread the risk of the cost of natural disasters. Specifically, “the
income tax system provides a certain level of implicit insurance which
emanates from provisions which allow for deduction of losses and, in
some instances, deduction of insurance payments, as well as the exclusion
of recoveries from insurance companies or the tortfeasors themselves.”250
Inherently, federal government spreads risk across the country, yet this
begs the question of taxation. Preference for the disaster zone may convey
congressional sympathy for the victim but “distorts tax policy, by, for
example, favoring the temporarily afflicted wealthy over the permanently
poor.”251 As in the Empowerment Zone where enhancements such as
those to depreciation were a bonus inaccessible to the poor, tax relief
could be little comfort to a displaced tenant. Nonetheless, GOZA ’05
offered numerous provisions.
Incentives to rebuild after the Gulf Coast hurricanes supplemented a
score of pre-existing provisions. These included: allowing a credit
relative to the wages paid to an employee retained in the GO Zone;252
enhancing depreciation;253 allocating toward tax-exempt and tax-credit
bonds;254 expanding the availability of advance refunding bonds;255 and
widening the scope for immediate deduction of demolition expenses.256
GOZA ’05 enhanced, within the disaster zone, the LIHTC and NMTC
enacted in TRA ’86 and CRTRA ’00 respectively.257 As in the
Empowerment Zones, the employment incentive was deployed in the GO
Zone. As in the New York Liberty Zone, public-private infrastructure
incentives applied in the GO Zone.
GOZA ’05 reflected the ecological nature of the disaster.
Consequently, businesses in the GO Zone benefited from increased
deductibility of: disaster loss of utilities;258 net operating loss (NOL) on
timberland;259 reforestation expenses;260 and environmental remediation
cost.261 Builders who restored historic structures received an enhanced
rehabilitation credit in the GO Zone.262 Employers who offered housing
to displaced employees received a credit for the cost, which became an
250. Terrence Chorvat & Elizabeth Chorvat, Income Tax as Implicit Insurance Against
Losses from Terrorism, 36 IND. L. REV. 425, 425–26 (2003).
251. Aprill & Schmalbeck, supra note 243, at 87.
252. I.R.C. § 1400R(a) (repealed 2018).
253. I.R.C. § 1400N(d) (repealed 2018).
254. I.R.C. § 1400N(a), (l) (repealed 2018).
255. I.R.C. § 1400N(b) (repealed 2018).
256. I.R.C. § 1400N(f) (repealed 2018).
257. See I.R.C. § 1400N(c), (m) (repealed 2018).
258. See I.R.C. § 1400N(j) (repealed 2018).
259. See I.R.C. § 1400N(i)(2) (repealed 2018).
260. See I.R.C. § 1400N(i)(1) (repealed 2018).
261. See I.R.C. § 1400N(g) (repealed 2018).
262. See I.R.C. § 1400N(h) (repealed 2018).
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excludable benefit.263 Employers could take an extended period to amend
their retirement plans to facilitate loans and other withdrawals by
hurricane victims.264 The victim-employees received relief from the ten
percent additional tax on early distributions and expanded ability to
recontribute withdrawals applied to the purchase of a home.265
Residential as well as commercial real estate was the object in the GO
Zone. In foregone federal revenue, the estimated cost of GOZA ’05 was
$8.668 billion over a decade.266
GOZA ’05 was unlike the previous legislation that focused almost
exclusively on business. Instead, the hurricane legislation responded to
the human tragedy with a number of provisions for individuals, especially
low-income taxpayers. GOZA ’05 effectively increased the refundable
earned income (EITC) and additional child tax credits (ACTC), in part
by allowing otherwise excludable combat pay of soldiers to increase
earned income.267 Both the EITC and ACTC supplement the wages of
low-income workers, so these provisions are qualitatively distinct from
most of the provisions that were for business. Of the overall cost of
GOZA ’05, $28 million was for the EITC and ACTC enhancements,
while another $14 million was attributable to the combat pay provision.268
These refundable credits were the direct measures of poverty alleviation
within the almost $9 billion bill.
Additionally, the Hope Scholarship and lifetime learning credits
increased for disaster victims.269 Of the overall cost of GOZA ’05, $55
million was attributable to the education credits.270
Under GOZA ’05, the deductibility of personal losses and charitable
contributions increased.271 In the case of corporate donations, they had to
be for hurricane relief to qualify for the increased deduction limit.272 Of
the overall cost of the bill, $1.174 billion was for the expansion of
personal losses, while $91 million was for charitable deductions.273
Procedurally, the legislation confirmed the extension of tax filing and
payment deadlines in the zone.274 Although GOZA ’05 did not target
See I.R.C. § 1400P (repealed 2018).
See I.R.C. § 1400Q(d) (repealed 2018).
See I.R.C. § 1400Q(a), (b) (repealed 2018).
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 109TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 109TH CONG. 792 app. (Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter JCT STAFF
2007].
267. See I.R.C. § 1400S(d) (repealed 2018); I.R.C. § 32(c)(2)(B)(vi).
268. JCT STAFF 2007, supra note 266.
269. See I.R.C. § 1400O (repealed 2018).
270. JCT STAFF 2007, supra note 266.
271. See I.R.C. § 1400S(a), (b) (repealed 2018).
272. See I.R.C. § 1400S(a)(4)(A)(ii) (repealed 2018).
273. JCT STAFF 2007, supra note 266.
274. See I.R.C. § 1400S(c) (repealed 2018).
263.
264.
265.
266.

2021]

FISCAL GEOGRAPHY

409

zones by poverty rate, it effectively delineated a geographic area for
economic assistance.275
Meanwhile, researchers continued to measure the effect of prior
legislation. In 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
reported that “improvements in poverty, unemployment, and economic
growth had occurred,” although the analysis “could not tie these changes
definitively to the [empowerment zone (EZ)] designation.”276 At the same
time, independent research on the empowerment zones in Baltimore,
Chicago, Detroit, and New York, which were otherwise undergoing an
urban renaissance of sorts, found that “zone initiatives had little
impact.’’277 Thus, the results continued to be ambiguous.
Then regional studies captured countervailing effects within local
zones. State ‘‘EZ property values are bid up by businesses seeking to
expand or locate operations in the EZs” effectively reducing “amounts
that these businesses would otherwise spend on capital assets or
labor.’’278 At least in the case of these state programs, the paradox of
displacement may have persisted.
Likewise, further study revealed offsetting effects. In 2008,
economists found evidence in the empowerment zones of decrease in
unemployment and poverty by a few percentage points, accompanied by
an increase in the value of housing.279 Similarly, a 2009 study of the
Empowerment Zones confirmed “a sizeable and significant positive
effect on home values.”280 Subsequent research would confirm that Texas
“EZ designation is associated with increases in home values.’’281
Increased housing value may relate to an increase in rent, which in turn
could disadvantage tenants, raising the question of the net effect of zone
incentives.282

275. See I.R.C. § 1400N(i)(1) (repealed 2018).
276. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-727, EMPOWERMENT ZONE AND
ENTERPRISE COMMUNITY PROGRAM: IMPROVEMENTS OCCURRED IN COMMUNITIES, BUT THE EFFECT
OF THE PROGRAM IS UNCLEAR 5 (2006).
277. Dierdre Oakley & Hui-shien Tsao, A New Way of Revitalizing Distressed Urban
Communities? Assessing the Impact of the Federal Empowerment Zone Program, 28 J. URB. AFF.
443, 443 (2006).
278. Jim Landers, Why Don’t Enterprise Zones Work? Estimates of the Extent that EZ
Benefits are Capitalized into Property Values, 36 J. REG’L ANALYSIS & POL’Y 15, 15 (2006).
279. See Matias Busso & Patrick Kline, Do Local Economic Development Programs Work?
Evidence from the Federal Empowerment Zone Program 21 (Yale Univ. Econ. Dep’t, Working
Paper No. 36, 2008).
280. Douglas J. Krupka & Douglas S. Noonan, Empowerment Zones, Neighborhood Change
& Owner-Occupied Housing, 39 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 386, 395 (2009).
281. Matthew Freedman, Targeted Business Incentives & Local Labor Markets, 48 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 311, 311 (2013).
282. See Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, The Economics of Place-Making Policies,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2008, at 155, 201–03.
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Researchers analyzed the relocation incentive of NMTC. The
researchers inferred that “corporations have most likely shifted
investment funds from higher income communities to NMTC-eligible
communities.’’283 Later, a think-tank would quantify significant ‘‘NMTC
investments per job generated for early-year projects.”284 While the
relocation incentive was confirmed, the overall effect may have remained
in question.285
E. Zone of Recovery
Next, Congress continued to respond to events. In 2008, the housing
and financial markets crashed in what became known as the Great
Recession. Then the tax subtitle of the American Recovery &
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA ’09) contained provisions for the
Recovery Zone (RZ).286 In particular, the legislation expanded the
portfolio of tax-credit bonds introduced by TpRA ’97.287 The legislation
allocated $1.4 billion for each of 2009 and 2010 as the face amount of
QZABs to be issued by the states in proportion to their unemployment
rates.288 Similarly, ARRA ’09 allocated $10 billion to RZ economic
development and $15 million to RZ facility tax-credit bonds.289 The Zone
related to a new incidence of unemployment.
Despite decades of legislation, the economic effects of the various
types of zones continued to be indeterminate. In 2010, California
researchers stated that “the evidence indicates that enterprise zones do
not increase employment.”290 More cautiously, GAO reported:
‘‘Although improvements in poverty, unemployment, and economic
growth had occurred in the EZs and ECs, our econometric analysis of the
eight urban EZs could not tie these changes definitively to the EZ
designation.’’291 To the extent that some evidence was positive, other
evidence was not.

283. Tami Gurley-Calvez et al., Do Tax Incentives Affect Investment? An Analysis of the New
Markets Tax Credit, 37 PUB. FIN. REV. 371, 371 (2009).
284. MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL ET AL., NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT (NMTC) PROGRAM
EVALUATION 122 (2013).
285. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-913, GULF OPPORTUNITY ZONE:
STATES ARE ALLOCATING FEDERAL TAX INCENTIVES TO FINANCE LOW-INCOME HOUSING & A
WIDE RANGE OF PRIVATE FACILITIES X (2008).
286. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
287. H.R. REP. NO. 111-16, at 582 (2009) (Conf. Rep.).
288. See I.R.C. § 54E (repealed 2017).
289. See I.R.C. § 1400U-1 (repealed 2018).
290. Jed Kolko & David Neumark, Do Some Enterprise Zones Create Jobs?, 29 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 5, 5 (2010).
291. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-464R, REVITALIZATION PROGRAMS:
EMPOWERMENT ZONES, ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES & RENEWAL COMMUNITIES 11 (2010).
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More recent studies emphasized positive effects. In 2011, economists
found that state and federal programs had “positive, statistically
significant impacts on local labor markets in terms of the unemployment
rate, the poverty rate, the fraction with wage and salary income, and
employment.’’292 In 2012, a study of the NMTC found “modest” but
“positive effects of subsidized investment in disadvantaged
neighborhoods.”293
In 2013, economists announced that the Federal ‘‘EZ designation
substantially increased employment in zone neighborhoods and
generated wage increases for local workers without corresponding
increases in population or the local cost of living.’’294 Other experts on
the Empowerment Zone countered: “If the goal of policy makers is to
induce relocation, it seems that even this modest objective may come at
a cost of destroying jobs and establishments in areas that compete with
targeted places.’’295 The offsetting effect persisted.
In 2014, regional scholars concluded that in the Empowerment Zone,
‘‘the tax incentives offered by the program notably enhance the quality
of business environment for firms in the area while modestly improving
the quality of life for the individuals living in the area.’’296 Decades of
studies seemed to point to modest effects at best.297
F. Land of OZ
Nevertheless, the current Zone followed the previous versions.298
TC&JA ’17 repealed the tax-credit and advance refunding bonds while
carving new OZs out of low-income Census tracts.299 If nominated by the
Governor and certified by the Treasury Secretary,300 an OZ also may be
a tract whose median family income does not exceed 125 percent of that

292. John C. Ham et al., Government Programs Can Improve Local Labor Markets:
Evidence from State Enterprise Zones, Federal Empowerment Zones & Federal Enterprise
Community, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 779, 779 (2011).
293. Matthew Freedman, Teaching New Markets Old Tricks: The Effects of Subsidized
Investment on Low-Income Neighborhoods, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 1000, 1013 (2012).
294. Matias Busso et al., Assessing the Incidence & Efficiency of a Prominent Place Based
Policy, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 897, 897 (2013).
295. Andrew Hanson & Shawn Rohlin, Do Spatially Targeted Redevelopment Programs
Spill Over?, 43 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON., 86, 99 (2013).
296. C. Lockwood Reynolds & Shawn Rohlin, Do Location-Based Tax Incentives Improve
Quality of Life & Quality of Business Environment?, 54 J. REG’L SCI. 1, 1 (2014).
297. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-500, NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT:
BETTER CONTROLS & DATA ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE EFFECTIVENESS 24 (2014).
298. See SEAN LOWRY & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45152, TAX INCENTIVES
FOR OPPORTUNITY ZONES: IN BRIEF (2019).
299. See Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97 §§ 13404, 13532, 131 Stat. 2054.
300. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(b).
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of the contiguous low-income community.301 Thus, an OZ need not itself
be poverty stricken.
The tax benefits in OZ include the following:302 An exclusion applies
to gain on an investment in a qualified opportunity fund (QOF), while a
deferral applies to reinvestment.303 The legislation effectively deems
basis to increase the longer an investment remains in the QOF.304 In turn,
the QOF is a corporation or partnership that invests in OZ business.305
Already, the Treasury has certified zones. There “are roughly 8,700
opportunity zones throughout the U.S. spanning aging Rust Belt towns,
low-income areas of major cities and rural swaths of the West.”306 Like
landscapes everywhere, the North American fiscal geography is an
artifact of Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions past and present. Over
a decade, the estimated value of the provisions is $1.6 billion in foregone
Federal revenue.307
Less than a year after enactment, a journalist editorialized as follows:
“Opportunity Zones weren’t created as a way to achieve specific social
goals but as a way to lower taxes on real estate ventures and shares of
stock that are usually held by the rich.”308 This commentary resonates
with that on LIHTC—the first generation of poverty zone tax
legislation—now dubiously associated with “slum-lords.”309
Notwithstanding the lack of empirical confirmation, the presentation
of business tax cuts as a potential relocation incentive has proven
irresistible to legislators over the decades. Through the legislation,
Congress has delineated geographic zones of poverty as the beneficiaries
of tax redistribution. Economists have observed modest take–up by
entrepreneurs.
See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(e)
See H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 537–38 (2017) (Conf. Rep.).
See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2.
See H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, supra note 302, at 400.
See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d).
Laura Davison, IRS Unveils Proposed Rules for Tax Law’s Big Capital Gains Break,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2018), https://pbn.com/irs-unveils-proposed-rules-for-tax-laws-big-capital
-gains-break-opportunity-zones/ [https://perma.cc/5UXQ-7E42]. See also Brett Theodos et al. An
Early Assessment of Opportunity Zones for Equitable Development Projects, URBAN INST. (June
2020), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/early-assessment-opportunity-zones-equitabledevelopment-projects/view/full_report [https://perma.cc/WX5H-ATAB]; Patrick Kennedy &
Harrison Wheeler, Neighborhood-level Investment from the U.S. Opportunity Zone Program:
Early Evidence, U.C. BERKELEY (Apr. 12, 2021), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/
early-assessment-opportunity-zones-equitable-development-projects/view/full_report [https://
perma.cc/56DX-TYQJ].
307. H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, supra note 302, at 688.
308. Alex Daniels, Will New Tax-Law Policy Help Needy Communities or Luxury Condo
Developers?, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/
Opportunity-Zones-Help-for/244790 [https://perma.cc/G2SH-UXHQ].
309. Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 184.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
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G. Summary
Inescapably, federal taxation is geographically redistributive. Where
a place is economically determinative, federal taxation also may
redistribute economically. Paradoxically, the free-market potential may
have spurred the proliferation of the legislative intervention in the poverty
zone. The welfare state grew to accommodate commercial investors. As
codified, taxation is incorporated into the rule of law. Yet questions of
equity and efficiency persist. The tax zone legislation deliberately
disrupts the horizontal equity between similarly situated taxpayers,
incentivizing relocation. The question is whether the resulting effect on
vertical equity was worth it. Geographically, the legislation targeted
distressed areas but not necessarily the low–income residents. Beyond
some incentives to earn income, most of the benefits accrued to outside
investors, whose businesses could have the effect of raising rent and the
cost of living for poor locals. If this was not the intended result, the
legislation was inefficient in allocating benefits.
This is not to mention the complexity and distortion of business
choices by the tax incentive. As the legislative premise, tax reduction was
the incentive for the entrepreneur to do business in the zone rather than a
similarly situated site. Yet exponents of free trade characterize “the
invisible hand of free markets” as “the force through which individuals
and businesses put economic resources to their greatest value.”310 In the
enterprise zone as well as elsewhere in fiscal geography, the “tax
code . . . gets in the way of free commerce . . . .”311 In sum, the legislative
creation of a market may not be free. While there is no return to the state
of nature, the land of OZ may not be the home of rationality.
IV. TRAVELERS IN THE LAND OF OZ
Generally, national tax law operates on the local taxpayer.
Traditionally, the discipline of public finance assumed a rational actor
who, as an enlightened individual, optimized the benefit for the cost. In
the case of the zoned incentives, the tax benefit may have been
infrequently worth the cost of doing business in the inner city or blighted
countryside. In the perception of the entrepreneurial taxpayer who was
the subject of the incentives, the cost of doing business in an inhospitable
market may have been too high. This Section considers the perspective
of the taxpayer whose behavior is not merely economic but also
psychological. The question of the take–up rate of tax incentives becomes
one of behavioral economics.
310. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR & PRO-GROWTH:
PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM, at 8 (2005).
311. Id.

414

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 31

Once the taxpayer is characterized as a psychological actor, this
Section extends that characterization to the tax collector. Neither are
government officials automatons. Instead, they too have a behavioral
rationale that in their case may be described as bureaucratic praxis.
Assuming the reality of the welfare state where the roles of taxpayer and
tax collector are not diametrically opposed, the issue becomes one of
coordination. In the case of the zones and other taxes, the legislation may
not neatly fit the needs of the targeted taxpayer. As a practical matter, it
may fall to the tax collector or other revenue agent to tailor the results.
The accommodation of local needs within federal law returns to historic
themes in fiscal geography.
A. The Psychological Taxpayer
If a zone of opportunity offers tax reduction, will people move there?
While a cost-minimizing rational actor would move, the experience
detailed above has yielded mixed results. What else drives people? While
ancient history began with agricultural subsistence, a more nuanced
analysis may help.312 First, “the meaning of subsistence cannot be
established independent of particular historical and cultural
circumstances if . . . definitions of social wants and needs were produced
under a given mode of production rather than immutably held down by
the Malthusian laws of population.”313 Where even subsistence is an
artifact, lower tax may not be enough incentive to move to a bad
neighborhood.
Second, people are not rational actors. Especially in industrial society,
“[e]conomic man himself has given way to the psychological man of our
times—the final product of bourgeois individualism.”314 Psychology
raises “a more primitive question as to whether individuals actually do
behave in the manner postulated, i.e., maximizing the expected
utility . . . by considering the probabilistic impact . . . .”315 Instead, “the
individuals are guided . . . by something much simpler, viz., just a desire
to record one’s true preferences.”316 Individuals in the bourgeois society
appear to express themselves rather than their calculated best interest.

312. SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHERS & OTHERS: THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING 4–5 (2009) (explaining that, as early as the Pleistocene, anthropologists observe,
ecological pressure to survive through cooperation yielded “[r]eflexively altruistic impulses” that
turned out to be “better than” the “self-interested” calculus of “rational actors”).
313. DAVID HARVEY, ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY (1974), reprinted in POPULATION, RESOURCES
& THE IDEOLOGY OF SCIENCE, SPACES OF CAPITAL: TOWARDS A CRITICAL GEOGRAPHY 61 (2001).
314. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF
DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS xvi (1979).
315. SEN, supra note 74, at 195.
316. Id. at 259.
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In the twenty-first century, commercial consumption has become
experiential. “Social media have encouraged younger people to show off
their experiences rather than their cars and wardrobes, and hipsterization
leads them to distinguish themselves by their tastes in beer, coffee, and
music.”317 The millennial generation may lead an advance beyond
acquisitive accumulation.
At the same time, the marketplace of ideas is flooded. Through the
mass media, “[t]ruth has given way to credibility, facts to statements that
sound authoritative without conveying any authoritative information.”318
According to American historians, “[t]rust in journalism began to weaken
during the Vietnam War, when reporters dutifully repeated the
government’s lies about the trajectory of the conflict.”319 Then
journalistic credibility “rebounded during Watergate, but it never
returned to its 1950s and 1960s heights, when Walter Cronkite was
dubbed the most trusted man in America.”320 When even the news may
be fake, a reader needs to become a consumer advocate.
The reactions have been defensive. In particular, psychologists
diagnose “identity-protective cognition, in which people cling to
whatever opinion enhances the glory of their tribe and their status within
it.”321 Then it becomes critical which “intuition of ‘tribe’ we are born
with . . . .”322 Naturally, this instinctive notion “cannot be a nation-state,
which is a historical artifact of the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia.”323
Nevertheless, people may seek solace in received social identities
especially during periods of economic distress and disruption.324
Defensive reactions may relate to risk aversion. Generally,
psychological actors “fight harder to prevent losses than to achieve
gains.”325 Risk aversion may be more motivating than opportunity.
On the other end of the spectrum, money may not be enough. At
higher income levels, “there is consumption satiation” when “work is
done for reasons barely connected with the income it provides to the

317. PINKER, supra note 124, at 135.
318. LASCH, supra note 314, at 74.
319. Nicole Hemmer, Five Myths About Cable News, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/five-myths/five-myths-about-cable-news/2018/11/09/
59e0b088-e3aa-11e8-ab2c-b31dcd53ca6b_story.html [https://perma.cc/J4EY-JB5Y] [hereinafter
Five Myths]; see NICOLE HEMMER, MESSENGERS OF THE RIGHT: CONSERVATIVE MEDIA & THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLICY (2016).
320. Five Myths, supra note 319.
321. PINKER, supra note 124, at 379.
322. Id. at 450.
323. Id.
324. See generally KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE LIES THAT BIND: RETHINKING IDENTITY
(2018).
325. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING: FAST & SLOW 305 (2011).

416

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 31

‘labourer’.”326 Those reasons include “self-regard and achievement” for
which “money is a proxy” in the case of “the billionaire looking for the
extra billion.”327 This sentiment is captured in a best-selling journalist’s
interview of an executive, who explained: “A man wants to get to the top
of the corporation . . . how much more money can you make? . . . It’s the
power, the status, the prestige.”328 A land of opportunity may not attract
a seeker of prestige locations.
In the tax incentive zones, decades of economic studies reflected
modest take-up rates. Evidently, the reduction in tax itself has not been
enough to induce the significant establishment of business in the inner
city or blighted countryside. That is, the tax reduction may not outweigh
the expense or perceived cost of locating in an unattractive area. In this
equation, the psychological identity of the taxpayer subject to the
incentive cannot be ignored.
B. The Practical Bureaucrat
To mirror the economic or rather psychological behavior of taxpayers,
consider the behavior of tax collectors.329 They enforce the rule of law,
assuming a modern salaried bureaucracy. In the popular imagination,
enforcement has fueled the “mutually hostile views held by tax collectors
and taxpayers.”330 In the case of the IRS, the bureaucracy developed as
follows.
In the twentieth century, the theory fit the problem. When the U.S.
taxpayer population expanded exponentially, mass production became an
inevitable solution to processing the myriad tax returns. Early in this
century, the leading socio-legal scholar who visited America from
Germany observed that standardization enabled government offices to
process a great volume of cases with formal disinterest at the cost of
substantive discretion, viz “without regard for persons” in a
“dehumanized” manner.331 At the time, bureaucracy meant efficient
modernization.
Mass production expanded under a model of scientific
management.332 Eponymously, American engineer Frederick Winslow
Taylor articulated this, describing an operation that “divided skills into a
326. J. A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV.
ECON. STUD. 175, 176 (1971).
327. KAHNEMAN, supra note 325, at 342.
328. STUDS TERKEL, WORKING: PEOPLE TALK ABOUT WHAT THEY DO ALL DAY & HOW THEY
FEEL ABOUT WHAT THEY DO 538 (1974).
329. See Eric A. San Juan, Bureaucratic Praxis, 83 MISS. L.J. 1, 2 (2014) (Supp.).
330. DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: POWER, POLICY AND THE IRS 42 (1989).
331. MAX WEBER, Bureaucracy (1913), in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 215–
16 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946).
332. TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 206–07 (2012).
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sequence of simple procedures to be taught to workers and monitored by
management.”333 In 1911, Taylor recommended “accurate records . . . of
the amount of work done by each man and of his efficiency,” to justify
adjustments of “each man’s wages” to be “raised as he improves, [while]
those who fail to rise to a certain standard are discharged . . . .”334 In 1925,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue established an Efficiency-Record Section
for personnel functions as well as training of income tax examiners and
technicians.335 Even today, any particular revenue agent may develop
efficiency in one skill or program, but few IRS employees (mostly highlevel executives) understand the tax code as a whole. As a result, a
treasury functionary may not comprehend how a provision affects the
taxpayer’s circumstances. Then critics complained that Taylorism
induced a clerk to “‘forget’ or not think about the intellectual content of
the text he is reproducing.”336 Despite the alienation inherent in Taylor’s
scientific management, it programmed adherence to the rules.
By the same token, the expanding inventory of tax returns made
examination of any one rare. As a practical matter, the tax collectors
would have to exercise tolerance. The latter turns out to be an
administrative prescription for accepting at face value a taxpayer’s return
or claim below a statistical threshold.337 The result is not lawless but
rather a “gapless” effect.338 Contrary to the crude version of legal realism,
administrative law depends not merely on what the official “ate for
breakfast.”339 If their advisors knew what would constitute an acceptable
return, coordination between the taxpayers and the tax collector
substantiates the rule of law.
If the taxpayer and the tax collector effectively coordinate, the tax
bureaucracy may be a locus where the rule of law is realized.
Traditionally, social scientists may have focused on courts, but
333. Smithsonian Institute, Carbons to Computers: A Short History of the Birth & Growth
of the American Office, SMITHSONIAN EDUC., http://www.smithsonianeducation.org/scitech/
carbons/scimgmt.html [https://perma.cc/9LMU-JF32] (last visited Aug. 1, 2021).
334. FREDERICK W. TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 23 (1919)
(quoting from presentation to American Society of Mechanical Engineers, June 1903).
335. The Efficiency-Record Section later merged into the Personnel Div. See IRS,
HISTORICAL FACT BOOK: A CHRONOLOGY, 1646-1992, at 99, 109, 114; 1920 Comm’r of Internal
Revenue Ann. Rep., at 12–13; 1922 Comm’r of Internal Revenue Ann. Rep., at 11; 1924 Comm’r
of Internal Revenue Ann. Rep., at 7.
336. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, Taylorism & the Mechanization of the Worker, in THE GRAMSCI
READER: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1916-1935 (David Forgacs ed. 1988). See Robert Kanigel, Taylormade, 37 SCI. 18 (N.Y. Acad. of Sci. 1997); MICHAEL MACCOBY, THE LEADERS WE NEED 22–23
(2007).
337. See Treas. Inspector Gen. Tax Admin. Rep. 2008-30-158 (Sept. 16, 2008) (“IRS Needs
to Evaluate Tolerance Levels to Ensure that Program Objectives Are Met”).
338. MAX WEBER, Economy & Law (Sociology of Law), in 2 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 657
(Guenther Roth et al. eds., 1978).
339. DWORKIN, supra note 78, at 153.
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“institutions of justice” refers not only to “institutions specially assigned
the task of resolving disputes, but rather applies to all institutions
addressed to provide a remedy.”340 (This is not to mention that “many
people prefer to bring their grievances to non-state institutions, including
traditional or religious leaders, trade unions, NGOs,”341 or the like). As
anthropologists have noted, “[t]ax law tells much about the nature of
government,” not just about revenue.342
C. The Para-Ethnographer
Just as taxpayers are psychological actors rather than cost-benefit
calculators, tax collectors are not mere automatons. On one hand, it would
be “low-minded sentimentalism” to assume “that everyone is constantly
motivated only by simple self-interest—and nothing else.”343 On the
other hand, it would be “high-minded sentimentalism” to assume that “all
human beings (and public servants in particular) try constantly to promote
some selfless ‘social good.’”344 Instead, tax collectors and other
bureaucrats have their own behavioral praxis.
Assuming the rule of law, bureaucrats act in an official, not personal,
capacity. In particular, tax collectors must “treat all members of their
community as equals, and the individual’s normal latitude for selfpreference is called corruption in their case.”345 Like other officials who
make determinations of fact, the tax collector “will develop, in the course
of his training and experience, a fairly individualized working conception
of law on which he will rely, perhaps unthinkingly, in making these
various judgments and decisions, and the judgments will be, for him, a
matter of feel or instinct rather than analysis.”346 Official judgment,
subject to administrative oversight by inspectors general as well as
judicial review by courts, is different from personal preference. As a
precursor of government oversight, even “the Inca could take any matter
out of the governor’s hands if he chose.”347 An official judgment must be
consistent with the position of the government as a whole.
Nevertheless, human judgment has been deemed necessary whenever
rules and regulations were not internally consistent. In the United States
and other industrial economies, the complexity of the revenue code is

340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Bedner & Vel, supra note 120, at 6.
Id. at 8.
MOORE, supra note 27, at 2.
SEN, supra note 74, at 38.
Id.
DWORKIN, supra note 78, at 174.
Id. at 256.
MOORE, supra note 27, at 113.
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legendary.348 The bureaucrat’s experience at negotiating bewildering
complexity vis-à-vis the taxpayer can be ethnographic in nature. This type
of experience has been captured by the journalist’s now historic interview
of a social insurance worker, who said, “After I got to OEO [the Office
of Economic Opportunity] it became more and more obvious to me that
a lot of these rules were wrong, that rules were not sacrosanct.”349 In some
cases, the bureaucrat may sympathize with the taxpayer more than with
the government.
Anthropologists have captured the self-awareness of the bureaucrat.
For an informant like the one interviewed, they have coined the term
“para-ethnography.”350 The latter describes bureaucratic praxis much as
behavioral economics describes taxpayer psychology.
When and where the rule of law has codified the concept of economic
opportunity or social rights, bureaucratic judgment becomes more
important. If the question is the affirmative obligation of the government
rather than merely a check on executive power, “the judiciary alone is not
sufficient to protect citizens, which is a logical result of the rise of the
welfare state.”351 Consequently, ombudsmen “have been adopted by
many countries.”352 In the United States, the Social Security
Administration employs approximately 1,500 administrative law judges
in 166 hearing offices across the country.353 By comparison, the IRS
stations a Local Taxpayer Advocate in each of the fifty states.354 These
quasi-judicial bureaucrats play an intermediary role between the
government and taxpayers.
For example, the IRS deploys administrative discretion in various
ways. In the context of natural disaster, the IRS instructs its operators to
accept at face value a telephone call asserting that the caller is an
“affected taxpayer” although not domiciled in the federally declared
disaster zone.355 Consequently, the caller avails him- or herself of
extensions of time to file returns and pay taxes.356 In routine tax

348. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 114TH CONG., COMPLEXITY IN THE FEDERAL TAX
SYSTEM (Comm. Print 2015).
349. TERKEL, supra note 328, at 345.
350. See DOUGLAS R. HOLMES & GEO. E. MARCUS, FAST CAPITALISM: PARA-ETHNOGRAPHY
& THE RISE OF THE SYMBOLIC ANALYST 44 (2006).
351. Bedner, supra note 122, at 70.
352. Id.
353. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-37, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY:
ADDITIONAL MEASURES & EVALUATION NEEDED TO ENHANCE ACCURACY & CONSISTENCY OF
HEARINGS DECISIONS 9 (Dec. 2017).
354. See I.R.C. § 7803 (2019).
355. IRM 25.16.1.8.1 (June 26, 2018).
356. See I.R.C. § 7508A (2019).
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examinations, receipts or documentation may be required. 357 In disaster,
IRS protocols recognize the exigency of the circumstances.
More generally, the IRS can waive penalties for failure to timely file
returns or pay taxes.358 The grounds would be reasonable cause, based on
ordinary business care and prudence, which the IRS has applied to a range
of circumstances from illness to ignorance of the law.359 “Death, serious
illness, or unavoidable absence of the taxpayer, or a death or serious
illness in the taxpayer’s immediate family, may establish reasonable
cause for filing, paying, or depositing late[.]”360 Logistically, these facts
are natural events in human life. In the case of ignorance, the IRS will
consider the taxpayer’s education as well as the objective facts of the case
relevant to taxation.361 The latter includes: any previous application of
the tax to the taxpayer; any previous penalty on the taxpayer; recent
changes in the tax forms or law which the taxpayer could not reasonably
be expected to know; and the level of complexity of the tax or compliance
issue.362 On the other hand, the level of education may characterize an
individual as a participant in society and not merely as a taxpayer. As
discussed above, social entitlements, such as those to health, education,
and welfare, may enable citizens to avail themselves of the rule of law.
To the extent that the IRS can grant relief in view of personal
characteristics, the bureaucracy may become more humane if more
subjective.
In the twenty-first century, proposals emerged for the IRS role in
social entitlements. Provisions such as the EITC, first-time home buyer
credit, and refundable premium tax credit for low-income patients under
the Affordable Care Act highlighted the tax collector’s role in welfare
administration.363 Incidentally, the Health Insurance Marketplace
Exchange may be the grandest federal act of market creation in this
century.364
Consequently, commentators proposed that the IRS create a new
office of Deputy Commissioner for social benefits.365 Although neither
the Congress nor the Administration acted on the proposal, it underscored
the extent to which tax expenditures had made the revenue agency an allaround fiscal facilitator of both collection and disbursement. Change in
bureaucratic behavior would become inevitable.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

See I.R.C. § 6001 (1982).
See I.R.C. § 6651 (2019).
See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6651-1(c) (2004).
IRM 20.1.1.3.2.2.1 (Nov. 25, 2011).
IRM 20.1.1.3.2.2.6. (Nov. 25, 2011).
Id.
See I.R.C. §§ 32, 36, 36B (2010).
See I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A).
See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 1 2010 ANN REP. TO CONG. 23.
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If the IRS and other government agencies conduct themselves
according to internal rationales, critics may fear the “Deep State.”366
Conspiracy theorists demonize “the government’s massive security
apparatus as conducted by the federal defense and intelligence
agencies.”367 Other skeptics “see ordinary imperfect human beings and
ordinary human institutions, acting too often with greed, fear, and with
messy self-interests.”368 Both view the Deep State as “a vast, selfperpetuating bureaucracy whose aim is singular: to exist again tomorrow
and the day after, to replicate itself, to be indestructible and nearly
impossible to disrupt.”369 It is an important sociological observation that
organizations, especially governmental entities, exist independently of
their members.370 Nonetheless, government bureaucracies in particular
are creatures of law. As exemplified above, reasonable cause is a
statutory concept. Consequently, lawmakers can regulate the
bureaucracy. Self-perpetuation of the Deep State should not become the
legislator’s excuse.
In the tax incentive zones, Congress intended to encourage commerce.
Originally, the Empowerment Zones were for local business rather than
those that relocated. Yet the face of the tax code allowed the relevant
credits and deductions based on the prescribed criteria. In processing the
applicable returns, the IRS would not have seen who relocated or not. As
a mass data processor, the IRS mechanically allowed the claims that met
the requirements. In microcosm, the tax collector was merely a
programmed mechanism. Had Congress wished the IRS to apply broader
criteria, the legislature could have done so. Of course, that could have led
to differing judgments and potential disputes. As it happened, the tax
legislation resulted in mechanical application. Whether particular
enterprises attracted community enthusiasm, the credits and deductions
fell where they did.
D. Summary
The effect of the zone incentives, like other tax legislation, depends
on the reaction of the taxpayer. In turn, a taxpayer acts in tandem with a
revenue agent. Traditionally, the taxpayer and tax collector were
366. JASON CHAFFETZ, THE DEEP STATE: HOW AN ARMY OF BUREAUCRATS PROTECTED
BARACK OBAMA AND IS WORKING TO DESTROY THE TRUMP AGENDA 9 (2018).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. See MICHAEL HERZFELD, THE SOC. PRODUCTION OF INDIFFERENCE: EXPLORING THE
SYMBOLIC ROOTS OF W. BUREAUCRACY (Bruce Kapferer & John Gledhill eds., 1992); EMILE
DURKHEIM, THE DIV. OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 329 (George Simpson trans., 1960). Bureaucracies
may be creatures of law to the extent that the “legislative department is everywhere extending the
sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 48
(James Madison).
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conceptualized as an adversarial pair. When a tax provision makes an
incentive rather than a liability, it becomes easier to see the revenue agent
as a reflective partner of the taxpayer. This characterization more easily
extends to other official functionaries in the welfare state. The collectors
may see themselves as collaborators who navigate the bureaucracy on
behalf of the taxpaying citizen. Both taxpayers and tax collectors are
people under economic and legal parameters that condition but do not
preempt their decision-making. This calls to mind the symbiosis between
taxpayer and tax collector as described by ancient texts.
V. GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION
Geographic redistribution always has been the effect of national tax
law. At the same time, economic redistribution has been the practice of
civilizations that sought to maintain their productive taxpayer population.
The tax zone provisions fit into this history. However, instead of
redistributing from rich to poor, much of this legislation seeks to lure
capital into poor neighborhoods. The results have been modest at best.
There may be no surprise here. The modest incentive effect of the tax
reduction offered in the poverty zones may be no surprise to the extent
that the federal income tax never drove business out in the first place. In
U.S. history, the so-called urban blight and heartland Rust Belt developed
in the context of industrial transformation. While the complete economic
history lies beyond the scope of this Article, an overview of the relevant
context follows.
In the mid-twentieth century, the Great Migration occurred.371 This
led a largely African American population from obsolescent agrarian
work northward to new manufacturing jobs. Subsequently, the inner city
became the site of “‘white flight,’ a process by which white households
left central cities to avoid living in racially diverse neighborhoods or
jurisdictions.”372 It’s unclear if this flight may have been motivated in
part by increasing property tax rates which in America are state rather
than federal imposts.373 Recent econometric research confirms that
“whites responded to this black influx by leaving cities” where any
“indirect effect on housing prices” accompanying a migration-induced

371. See JAMES R. GROSSMAN, LAND OF HOPE: CHICAGO, BLACK SOUTHERNERS, AND THE
GREAT MIGRATION 3 (1989).
372. Leah Platt Boustan, Was Postwar Suburbanization “White Flight”? Evidence from the
Black Migration, 125 Q.J. ECON. 417, 418-19 (2010) [hereinafter Boustan I]. See also LEAH
PLATT BOUSTAN, COMPETITION IN THE PROMISED LAND: BLACK MIGRANTS IN NORTHERN CITIES
& LABOR MARKETS 148 (Princeton Univ. P. 2017) (“white households left central cities to avoid
fiscal/political interactions with black arrivals through shared municipal elections and public
schools”).
373. Boustan I, supra note 372, at 420.
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increase in demand was not the “sole cause” of their departure.374
Assuming the pre-existing population was not merely rational optimizers,
it may be no surprise that their geographic decision reflected their
psychological identity. To the extent that the empirical studies have not
applied this reasoning to the tax zone legislation, a topic for future
research persists.
A case in point is the Rio Grande Valley. Designated an
Empowerment Zone, the formerly agrarian area remains impoverished.375
“When agricultural jobs were plentiful along the border, generations of
people came to South Texas for work.”376 Now, “sectors such as
agriculture have shrunk.”377 Many colonia communities that remain in
the “vast, arid region” have “no access to drinkable water.”378 Physical
geography may be as much to blame for the barren landscape as any
federal income tax burden.
As of the late twentieth century, American industry was in decline.
Geographers observed that the “manufacturing sectors of central cities,
which have always been more vulnerable to expressions of organized
discontent or political regulation, have been reduced to zones of . . . high
unemployment.”379 In particular, “cities like Chicago, New York, Los
Angeles, and Baltimore have seen their traditional blue-collar
manufacturing employment cut in half in the last 20 years” of the past
Century.380 If so, it is no wonder that the first Empowerment Zone
legislation was a response to the Los Angeles Riots.
As American industry declined, technology proliferated across the
Pacific. Specifically, the “rise of China” became “no doubt one of the
most important events in world economic history since the Industrial
Revolution.”381 Like the eighteenth and nineteenth century Great
Transformation in the North Atlantic, the current industrialization in Asia
would be disruptive on a world-historic scale.382 This is the context in
which the U.S. landscape changed.
Similarly, the Rust Belt formed upon the obsolescence of the heavy
industry that had dotted the American countryside. Geographers noted
that the “dispersal and creation of many new jobs in rural settings has
374. Id. at 417.
375. See JORDANA BARTON ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, LAS COLONIAS IN THE
21ST CENTURY: PROGRESS ALONG THE TEXAS-MEXICO BORDER 2 (2015).
376. Id.
377. Id. at 10.
378. Id. at 1, 3.
379. DAVID HARVEY, JUSTICE, NATURE & THE GEOGRAPHY OF DIFFERENCE 337 (1996).
380. Id.
381. Wen, supra note 134, at ix.
382. See generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLICY & ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF OUR TIMES (1944).
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facilitated capitalist control over labor.”383 Thus, rural and urban facilities
had been the location not only of agriculture but also “electronics and
other supposedly ultra-modern industries.”384 Those jobs were
superseded by world-wide industrialization, especially in Asia.
Economists confirm the developing “global middle [class], which mostly
consists of Chinese and Indians, has enjoyed massive growth over the
past few decades.”385 Social scientists agree “the world’s poor have
gotten richer in part at the expense of the American lower middle
class.”386 This is not to mention that “Japan’s lost decade and the collapse
of the Soviet Union are largely responsible for the slow growth of this
cohort.”387 Lower middle-class resentment, caused by economic
displacement, can fester in the East as well as in the West. The Rust Belt
was a casualty of economic history.
Federal income taxation would not have been the cause of the
technological transformation of the world economy. Consequently, it
may be no surprise that the tax zone incentives have not lured commerce
back to the mines and industrial plants in the hinterland or inner cities.
To the extent that the empirical studies have not analyzed the legislation
in this light, the topic remains open for future research.
Meanwhile, the geographic intuition of the legislature is undeniable.
Since the time of the first lawmakers, the legislature has imposed taxation
not merely to collect the revenue for public functions but effectively to
redistribute the national wealth. Any flaw in the tax zone concept by
exception proves the rule of redistributive taxation over the long course
of economic history. The lesson may be that market creation requires an
intervention more heroic than narrow tax incentives.
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the American political
economy had reached an equilibrium. The post-World War II bipolarity
had subsided, yet the United States remained a superpower. At that point,
the reigning consensus between the major electoral parties was such that
third-party candidates could describe themselves as “Demicans” versus
“Republocrats.”388 Among other world-historical events, the Sinocentric
industrial revolution emerged. Lately, the U.S. presidential election
featured perhaps the most notorious socialist candidate since Eugene
383. MICHAEL KEITH & STEVE PILE, PLACE AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 43 (1993).
384. Id.
385. Homi Kharas & Brina Seidel, What’s Happening to the World Income Distribution?
The Elephant Chart Revisited 15 (Brookings Inst. Global Econ. & Dev. Program, Working Paper
No. 114, 2018).
386. PINKER, supra note 124, at 113.
387. Kharas & Seidel, supra note 385.
388. A prominent supporter of the 3rd-party candidate said, “I am going to vote for Ralph”
Nader, who “will draw votes from Bush as well as Gore . . . both Republocrats and Demicans.”
ROB ROSENTHAL & SAM ROSENTHAL, PETE SEEGER: IN HIS OWN WORDS (2015); see supra note 10
and accompanying text.
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Debs as well as a victor associated with white nationalism.389 In the end,
the electorate had stark ideological choices (both voiced by white,
patriarchal authority figures).390
Meanwhile, the Rust Belt and urban blight had become economic
casualties. Then the disruption would afford political opportunities for
previously marginalized interests across the spectrum.391 To the extent
that disruption of entrenched power itself opens opportunity, the future
had begun.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has described the OZ provision as the latest in a series of
tax zone incentives enacted over the past few decades. To evaluate the
effectiveness of these bills, this Article reviewed the relevant economic
literature. Moreover, the theory underlying the legislation is
understandable in the context of the historical and philosophical
foundation in local and national taxation, or fiscal geography. Thus, tax
zones represent a nexus of law and social science.
Taxation begins with the taxpayer, wherever he or she lives. There the
taxpayer produces revenue on the farm, in the shop, or elsewhere. When
production generates a surplus over subsistence, taxpayers build
civilizations. These complex states require coordination by law and
economic distribution throughout the society. Fundamental questions of
justice arise.
Historically, solutions followed. The maintenance of the parochial
population was a natural exigency, and national taxation was
geographically and economically redistributive. Anthropologists
observed that the “interlocking of local and national interests has a
contemporary (one might even say a universal) flavor of competition for
resources and power.”392 Since geography may determine where there is
a feast or a famine, the national fiscal function could equalize life
chances.
Currently, the tax incentive zones reflect the long-standing
propositions. Where a population forms a pocket of poverty, lawmakers
389. James Hohmann, Bernie Sanders Has a Eugene V. Debs Problem, WASH. POST (Jan.
22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/01/22/the-daily-202bernie-sanders-has-a-eugene-v-debs-problem/ [https://perma.cc/X3AR-VF2G]; Jonathan Allen,
In the Dark Corners of White Nationalism, the Talk is of Trump, NBC News (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/dark-corners-white-nationalism-talk-trumpn926221 [https://perma.cc/U2ZW-E34N].
390. See Dana Milbank, Bernie is the Left’s Version of Trump, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bernie-sanders-has-emerged-as-the-donald-trump-ofthe-left/2019/04/02/66a516f4-5576-11e9-8ef3-fbd41a2ce4d5_story.html [https://perma.cc/YM
C8-CEJH].
391. See ROBERTO UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK 70 (2004).
392. MOORE, supra note 27, at 72.

426

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 31

may be inclined toward relief of economic distress. Federal tax legislation
may be a suitable vehicle for geographic redistribution. At the same time,
the legislators may wish to create markets for commercial production.
Thus, the Empowerment Zones were supposed to incentivize local
entrepreneurs. Responding to acts in the nature of war and disaster, the
Liberty and GO Zones were for reconstruction in rich and poor cities,
respectively. In the Great Recession, the Recovery Zone was for areas of
unemployment. Now the OZ is for equity investment in poverty zones.
Over decades of experience, the economic effect of the various tax
incentives has proven modest at best.
The effect of the tax incentive zones fits into a larger analytic context.
At a microeconomic level, incentives apply to rational actors. Yet the
taxpayer to whom the zone offered the incentive may have behaved
psychologically rather than rationally. Among the psychological factors
would have been the perception of the inner city or “blighted”
countryside. At this point, the role of the tax collector was to allow the
applicable credits or deductions mechanically. It remained with Congress
to authorize proactive welfare or business administration.
As a matter of fiscal geography, taxation is not merely the
measurement of the codified ability to pay. The preparation of returns and
collection of revenue are the government’s center of gravity. The
counterposed behavior of taxpayers and officials is an essential encounter
in the state’s expansion or contraction. Taxation needs to balance
between psychological and cultural as well as economic and legal norms.
At a macroeconomic level, global transformation has occurred. By the
twenty-first century, American industrial growth was on the decline
relative to that in China. Although focused federal income tax reduction
could shift some economic distress among the 50 states, the zone
provisions may be no match for world-historic forces. In the ongoing
trans-Pacific industrial revolution, socioeconomic disruption is certain.
The question remains which measures the countries may adopt to ensure
the life chances of their inhabitants.

